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In any given metropolitan region, scores of municipalities are locked in a zero-
sum struggle for mobile sources of jobs and tax revenue. This competition appears to 
benefit small, homogeneous suburbs that can directly enact the uniform will of the 
electorate over large, diverse cities that are often ensnarled in conflict between 
competing interest groups. Cities can level the playing field with suburbs, however, 
by devolving municipal power to smaller, more homogeneous subgroups, such as 
neighborhoods. Indeed, many commentators have identified one such effort at 
neighborhood empowerment, the “business improvement district” (BID), as a key 
factor in the recent revitalization of many cities. The BID and the related “special 
assessment district” devolve the financing of infrastructure and services to landowners 
within a territorially designated area. Courts have widely upheld BIDs and special 
assessment districts against constitutional challenges.  
Cities remain hamstrung in competing with suburbs, however, because courts 
prohibit cities from delegating what is perhaps the most coveted power of all to 
neighborhood groups: zoning. Since an unusual series of Supreme Court cases in the 
early twentieth century, it has been largely settled that cities may not constitutionally 
delegate the zoning power to sub-municipal groups, at least where the power is 
delegated specifically to landowners within a certain distance from a proposed land 
use change (a scheme I designate a “neighborhood zoning district”).  
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This Article argues that the judicial prohibition on neighborhood zoning districts 
is inconsistent with the judiciary’s permissive attitude toward BIDs and special 
assessment districts. As I demonstrate, the neighborhood zoning district is concept-
ually identical to the special assessment district/BID. Both devices are designed to 
enable large, diverse cities to capture some of the governance advantages of small, 
homogeneous suburbs by providing landowners with the direct ability to manage 
local externalities. This Article attempts to make sense of the disparate treatment 
accorded these devices by examining several grounds upon which they could 
potentially be, and have been, distinguished. I find, however, that the only mean-
ingful distinction between these mechanisms is that special assessment districts/BIDs 
actually raise far more troubling public policy concerns than neighborhood zoning 
districts, thus calling into question why the judiciary has been so much more 
deferential toward the former than the latter. I conclude that courts should broadly 
defer to municipal delegations of power to sub-local groups, so that cities can work 
out their own strategies for surviving in an era of intense interlocal competition.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Some species evade predators by mimicking other creatures, but only 
one survives by imitating its own predator: the city. It is by now a familiar 
story that many jobs and people have fled the cities and flocked to the 
suburbs over the past half-century.1 Suburbs have been more attractive than 
central cities as sites for settlement and investment, at least in part because 
their relatively smaller and more homogeneous populations have enabled 
suburbs to ensure that landowners’ tax expenditures are concentrated on 
their own needs, rather than subjected to the redistributive claims of a 
variety of citywide interest groups.2 Suburbs also enjoy wide latitude to use 
 
1 The population of suburban communities more than doubled between 1950 and 1970, com-
prising 83% of the nation’s total growth during that period, while American cities suffered a net 
loss of population from 1950 to 1980. KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE 
SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES 283 (1985). By 1970, more Americans dwelled in 
suburbs than in cities and rural areas combined, and by 1980 the suburban population in virtually 
every major metropolitan area outnumbered that of the central city. Id. Although cities have 
experienced a well-documented resurgence in recent years, the majority of Americans continue to 
reside in relatively small suburban communities. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER 
HYPOTHESIS 15 (2001). 
2 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Rise of Sublocal Structures in Urban Governance, 82 MINN. L. 
REV. 503, 506 (1997) (observing that cities’ greater diversity vis-à-vis suburbs is likely to cause a 
“greater heterogeneity of preferences” and thus a higher degree of dissatisfaction among city 
residents); Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: 
Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 2018 (2000) (arguing that the 
“smallness and homogeneity” of suburban communities enable them “to wield local powers to 
exclude undesirables and pursue the locality’s collective self-interest”); Robert C. Ellickson, New 
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the zoning power to protect their tax bases and landowners’ property values 
by excluding undesirable uses without interference from other stakeholders, 
like real estate developers, who may have divergent demands.3  
In recent decades, however, cities have experienced something of a 
renaissance, which many attribute to city officials’ realization that in order 
to entice and retain investment in the face of suburban competition, cities 
must somehow provide the benefits that small size and homogeneity afford 
the suburbs.4 Thus, for example, many cities enable neighborhood groups to 
 
Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 DUKE L.J. 75, 89 (1998) (noting that with increasing size, 
cities are less able to limit and hence more susceptible to influence “by rent-seeking groups such as 
political machines, municipal unions, public works lobbies, and downtown business interests”). 
3 See, e.g., FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 15-16 (arguing that homeowners are the dominant fac-
tion in small, suburban communities and that they use zoning controls to protect their own wealth 
while developers are largely “supplicants”); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and 
Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 372-74 (1990) (explaining that neighborhood groups in 
cities cannot effectively control their own zoning because they must compete for power with other 
interests within the same polity, whereas suburbs, which are frequently just incorporated 
neighborhoods, can control their own zoning without interference from competing groups). 
4 See, e.g., Richard Schragger, Does Governance Matter? The Case of Business Improvement Dis-
tricts and the Urban Resurgence, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 49, 58-61 (2010) (surveying and critiquing 
literature attributing urban resurgence to efforts by city officials to entice mobile sources of 
revenue from other cities and suburbs). The widespread assumption that cities and suburbs are 
locked in a zero-sum competition for mobile sources of revenue stems from the predominant 
“Tiebout model” of local government. For the origins of this model, see Charles M. Tiebout, A 
Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418 (1956). According to the model, 
individuals in a metropolitan region with a variety of municipal jurisdictions are properly 
conceived as “consumer-voters” who essentially shop for a municipality that provides them with 
their preferred package of municipal services. Id.; see also Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land 
Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 507-08 
(1991) (explaining that not only do consumers “‘shop’ for a particular level and combination of 
public goods,” but municipalities may also “compete for residents by trying to offer a desirable 
package of services at the lowest cost” (footnote omitted)); Briffault, supra note 3, at 400 (“The 
multiplicity of localities assures a range of choices and increases the likelihood that one locality 
will approximate the mobile consumer-voter’s preferences.”). Under this model, local govern-
ments, and especially central cities, can entice consumer-voters to live in their own communities 
only by offering superior (or cheaper) amenities and services to neighboring communities. See 
Edward L. Glaeser, The Death and Life of Cities (describing the rise and decline of cities as a 
function of both private activity and government efforts to offer amenities to citizens and pro-
growth regulatory environments to businesses), in MAKING CITIES WORK: PROSPECTS AND 
POLICIES FOR URBAN AMERICA 22, 25-30 (Robert P. Inman ed., 2009). This model has been 
criticized but is still highly influential. See Schragger, supra, at 66 (arguing that “the basic idea of 
‘competition’ between cities is incoherent” because sound local governance rarely creates growth; 
rather, prosperity “is often a function of luck, path dependency, or the effects of very small 
changes in a spatial equilibrium”); Richard C. Schragger, Rethinking the Theory and Practice of Local 
Economic Development, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 311, 315-20 (2010) (criticizing the Tiebout public choice 
theory for adopting an overly simplistic notion of how cities develop, particularly through the 
assumption that local policies affect economic development instead of acknowledging the role 
organic growth plays in development).  
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self-finance improvements and services for their areas through a “special 
assessment”5 or the related “business improvement district” (BID).6 These 
mechanisms typically work by enabling a percentage of landowners within a 
territorially bounded district to petition the city for the imposition of a 
mandatory charge upon all property in the district in order to fund desired 
amenities for the area.7 Likewise, some municipalities have attempted to 
give neighborhoods the authority to directly exclude undesirable land uses, 
such as by enfranchising landowners within a geographically defined area to 
vote on the applicability of specific zoning restrictions within that area.8 For 
ease of reference, I call this device a “neighborhood zoning district.” The 
special assessment district and the neighborhood zoning district are both, 
fundamentally, efforts to import into the city the most attractive features of 
suburban governance by devolving power to the smaller scale of the neighbor-
hood, homogenizing the voting public through the restriction of the fran-
chise to landowners, and insulating the group’s power from the politicking 
and vote-trading prevalent at the citywide level.9  
Herein, however, lies the problem that this Article seeks to resolve: 
although neighborhood zoning districts and special assessment districts are 
functionally similar mechanisms through which cities can compete with 
suburbs, courts and scholars treat them as entirely distinct. While courts 
have routinely upheld the special assessment and the BID against constitu-
tional challenges, the majority of courts have also held that the neighbor-
hood zoning district is an unconstitutional delegation of municipal land use 
 
5 See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 619-34 
(3d ed. 2005) (introducing the concepts of special assessments and BIDs and discussing the ways 
in which courts have approached them); Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the 
“Get What You Pay For” Model of Local Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 373, 397-402 (2004) 
(describing the evolution of special assessments from a mechanism for financing finite capital 
improvement projects into a general revenue raising tool). 
6 See generally Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement Districts 
and Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365, 381-87 (1999) (describing the process of BID 
formation); Symposium, Business Improvement Districts and the Evolution of Urban Governance, 3 
DREXEL L. REV. 1 (2010) (exploring various legal issues related to BIDs).  
7 See infra Section I.C. 
8 See, e.g., Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 118 (1928) 
(describing a local ordinance requiring the consent of two-thirds of property owners located 
within 400 feet of any proposed group home); Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 
526, 527-28 (1917) (evaluating a law requiring the consent of landowners owning the majority of 
property on a block before a billboard company could put up a billboard on that block); Eubank v. 
City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 141 (1912) (describing an ordinance delegating power to block-
front landowners to establish uniform setback lines). See also generally JEFFREY M. BERRY ET 
AL., THE REBIRTH OF URBAN DEMOCRACY 141 (1993) (describing efforts by five cities to 
devolve land use powers to neighborhood groups).  
9 See infra Section I.D. 
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power.10 The courts make no effort to reconcile the two lines of precedent, 
and indeed seem unaware that there may even be a relationship between 
them.11 Scholars, too, have endorsed the special assessment and BID while 
balking at the idea of conferring zoning powers on neighborhood groups, 
without acknowledging the deep continuities between these two devices.12 
Major consequences for urban policy have ensued. On the one hand, 
neighborhood groups’ inability to exercise more influence over land use 
decisions has caused significant disenchantment with city government, in 
some cases even sparking campaigns for secession from the city.13 On the 
other hand, spurred by courts’ permissive attitude, cities have increasingly 
resorted to BIDs as a default option to deal with virtually any urban 
 
10 See infra Sections II.A. & II.B. 
11 See, e.g., Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass’n, 158 F.3d 92, 108 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(affirming the constitutionality of a BID voting structure without considering neighborhood 
zoning cases); Cary v. City of Rapid City, 559 N.W.2d 891, 895-96 (S.D. 1997) (invalidating a 
neighborhood zoning ordinance without considering special assessment cases). I discuss the 
relationship between the two lines of doctrine in more detail infra Section II.C.  
12 See Ellickson, supra note 2, at 98-99 (endorsing a neighborhood association that would 
provide services financed by mandatory assessment but expressing skepticism about delegating 
zoning power); George W. Liebmann, Devolution of Power to Community and Block Associations, 25 
URB. LAW. 335, 346 (1993) (same). For a more detailed discussion of Ellickson and Liebmann’s 
articles, see infra text accompanying notes 132-37 & 266-68. Robert Nelson, the rare scholar who 
has actually advocated for neighborhood zoning control, neither discusses any of the applicable 
precedent holding that the delegation of zoning authority to neighborhood groups is unconstitu-
tional, nor directly compares neighborhood zoning districts with special assessment districts, as 
this Article does. See ROBERT H. NELSON, PRIVATE NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE TRANS-
FORMATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 403-08 (2005) (discussing several lines of potentially 
applicable precedent but ignoring the delegation cases); infra note 138 and accompanying text. 
13 In New York, residents of the borough of Staten Island initiated a drive to secede from 
New York City after the United States Supreme Court held that the city’s “one borough, one 
vote” method for electing members of its zoning and budget authority violated the constitutionally 
mandated “one person, one vote” formula and ordered the city to reconstitute the authority, 
thereby diluting Staten Island’s voice in land use matters. Richard Briffault, Voting Rights, Home 
Rule, and Metropolitan Governance: The Secession of Staten Island as a Case Study in the Dilemmas of 
Local Self-Determination, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 775, 783-85 (1992). Across the continent in Los 
Angeles, homeowners in the vast adherent suburb of the San Fernando Valley have frequently 
sought to secede from the city, citing concerns about taxes, school busing, and a desire to exercise 
tighter control over their own land use. RAPHAEL J. SONENSHEIN, THE CITY AT STAKE: 
SECESSION, REFORM, AND THE BATTLE FOR LOS ANGELES 72-83 (2004); see also M. Purcell, 
Metropolitan Political Reorganization as a Politics of Urban Growth: The Case of San Fernando Valley 
Secession, 20 POL. GEOGRAPHY 613, 617-26 (2001). The secession campaigns in both New York 
and Los Angeles have failed, usually despite significant support within the aggrieved areas, 
because state law in New York and California, as in most states, requires secession to be approved 
by a referendum of voters within the entire city. GERALD E. FRUG ET AL., LOCAL GOVERN-
MENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 433, 439 (5th ed. 2010). 
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problem, despite the fact that BIDs often cause troubling inequalities 
between wealthy and poor neighborhoods in the provision of city services.14  
This Article argues that the judicial proclivity to uphold special assess-
ment districts and BIDs while invalidating neighborhood zoning districts is 
doctrinally illogical and indefensible as a matter of public policy. Indeed, 
because neither the jurisprudence nor the scholarly literature acknowledge 
any connection between these two devices, no one to date has undertaken to 
defend the disparate treatment accorded them. For purposes of this Article, 
I read the doctrine and literature broadly in an effort to divine a basis for 
the divergent lines of case law. On this broad reading, it appears that courts 
and scholars see the special assessment and BID as essentially voluntary 
efforts by neighborhood landowners to provide themselves with supplemen-
tal services, while they view zoning as the coercive regulation of land use.15 
In addition, courts and commentators seem concerned that if neighborhoods 
are empowered to zone land, they will do so in such a way as to impose 
undesired impacts on surrounding areas.16 Courts and observers exhibit 
much less concern about the spillover impacts of special assessment dis-
tricts, perhaps because they assume that such districts merely provide one 
neighborhood with desired supplemental municipal services and therefore 
have minimal negative impacts on neighboring areas.17  
 As this Article demonstrates, however, these arguments are all seriously 
flawed. Initially, I show that special assessments are just as coercive and just 
as likely to impose undesirable spillover impacts as neighborhood zoning 
districts are. In addition, special assessment districts often present far more 
troubling public policy concerns than neighborhood zoning districts. 
Specifically, special assessment districts raise the classic Madisonian problem 
of a locally dominant majority exploiting a locally vulnerable minority, 
whereas neighborhood zoning districts are less likely to raise this problem. 
Arguably, therefore, the courts have their standards of review exactly 
backward—neighborhood zoning districts deserve more deference than 
special assessment districts, not less. This Article does not argue, however, 
that courts should simply reverse the current simplistic approach and 
 
14 See Gerald E. Frug, The Seductions of Form, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 11, 17 (2010) (lamenting 
that the “almost automatic answer when one seeks to create an organization to improve neighbor-
hood life” is “Let’s create a BID,” and asserting that the BID is simply not applicable to the wide 
array of urban challenges and that “we need more options”); Reynolds, supra note 5, at 433-35 
(describing the problem of intralocal service inequalities with BIDs and special assessment 
districts). 
15 See infra notes 132-38 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra Section III.C. 
17 See infra notes 132-35 and accompanying text. 
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declare that all neighborhood zoning districts are valid and all special 
assessments districts are infirm. Rather, it proposes that the courts evaluate 
the validity of any particular delegation by considering a set of ad hoc 
factors that assess the extent to which the delegation creates a risk of 
majoritarian exploitation. 
In addition to proposing a new approach to the delegation question, the 
Article more broadly reexamines the legal status of the neighborhood and 
particularly the relationship between neighborhoods and municipalities. 
This Article is part of a larger project which explores the question of why 
courts have granted incorporated municipalities a privileged status that they 
deny to unincorporated neighborhoods, notwithstanding that many munici-
palities are themselves little more than glorified neighborhoods. Here, the 
judicial skepticism toward neighborhood control of zoning contrasts sharply 
with a long tradition in which courts have broadly deferred to land use 
determinations by municipalities.  
As before, this distinction between neighborhoods and municipalities 
seems tenuous as a legal matter and almost backwards as a matter of public 
policy. A scheme in which neighborhood groups enjoy some limited powers 
under the oversight of a larger municipal authority could be a far superior 
system of local government than our existing one, in which scores of 
autonomous suburbs each have carte blanche to make their own land use 
and fiscal policies without any regard for their neighbors or the general 
welfare of the region. A revised scheme would also, incidentally, enable 
cities to compete on a more level economic footing with incorporated 
suburban communities.  
Part I provides some background on the special assessment district and 
the neighborhood zoning district, revealing the ways in which these devices 
are functionally symmetrical. Part II then chronicles the wholly divergent 
paths courts have taken in analyzing special assessment districts and neighbor-
hood zoning districts. Part III examines several possible means of reconcil-
ing the two doctrinal lines, but concludes by only deepening the mystery: 
special assessment districts actually present much greater cause for judicial 
skepticism than neighborhood zoning districts. This Part then sets forth 
some analytical tools that courts should use to determine on an ad hoc basis 
when a delegation of power to a neighborhood group raises red flags. 
Finally, Part IV broadens the inquiry to the question of neighborhood 
empowerment more generally, concluding that little justification exists for a 
jurisprudence that grants incorporated municipalities such an elevated 
normative position over unincorporated neighborhoods.  
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I. MANAGING LOCAL EXTERNALITIES BY DEVOLVING  
POWER TO LANDOWNERS 
A. Neighbors and Externalities 
The aim of this Part is to show that neighborhood zoning districts and 
special assessment districts are, at their core, symmetrical mechanisms for 
dealing with local “externalities.”18 A pair of simple examples will illustrate 
the basic externality problem. If my neighbor maintains a carefully mani-
cured front lawn, I enjoy for free the aesthetic benefits of her activity. If, by 
contrast, my neighbor covers her lawn with junk and debris to express her 
opposition to mass consumer culture, it becomes a blight on the entire 
neighborhood.19 Both of these activities are called externalities (a positive 
and negative externality, respectively)20 because, in either case, the impact 
of my neighbor’s activity on my property is irrelevant to her decision 
whether or not to undertake the activity. In the first example, although I 
benefit from my neighbor’s landscaping, she is unable to seek payment from 
me for the benefits I have obtained. As a result, if it proves unprofitable for 
my neighbor to continue tending her lawn, she may cease doing so even if I 
and many other neighbors derive substantial benefits from it.21 Likewise, in 
the second example, although my neighbor’s junk-strewn lawn causes me 
significant harm, she is immune to the costs it imposes on me absent 
nuisance liability, which rarely covers aesthetic harms.22 She will continue 
 
18 On the concept of externalities generally, see N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF 
MICROECONOMICS 195-213 (6th ed. 2008). On the significance of externalities to land use 
regulation, see ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 43-45, 110-11, 174-76 
(5th ed. 2008); JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 46-50 (7th ed. 2010). On externalities 
and the related issue of “public goods,” see KENNETH A. SHEPSLE & MARK S. BONCHEK, 
ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR, AND INSTITUTIONS 260-96 (1997). 
19 This hypothetical is loosely inspired by the case of People v. Stover, 191 N.E.2d 272, 273 
(N.Y. 1963), in which homeowners hung laundry in their front yards to protest high property 
taxes. The court held that a municipal ordinance that prohibited hanging laundry in front yards, 
passed in the wake of the protests, did not violate the First Amendment. Id. at 276-77.  
20 On positive and negative externalities, see MANKIW, supra note 18, at 195-201; and SHEPSLE 
& BONCHEK, supra note 18, at 278.  
21 This problem is the central concern of Richard Musgrave’s classic work on public finance, 
The Theory of Public Finance. As Musgrave puts it, “Establishment of an expensive store may 
increase real estate values in the neighborhood, even though the store cannot collect for the 
services thus rendered. . . . Since the market permits a price to be charged for only a part of the 
services rendered, the development may be unprofitable from the private, but profitable from the 
public, point of view.” RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 7 (1959). 
22 See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 18, at 738 (“Most courts hold that unsightliness 
alone does not a nuisance make . . . .”); ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 5, at 519 (“Traditional 
nuisance law did not protect aesthetic sensibilities.”). 
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to foul our collective landscape with little regard for my well-being as long 
as doing so is beneficial to herself.23 
While homeowners understandably treasure their aesthetic environ-
ment, often more is at stake than just appearances. Studies consistently 
demonstrate that just about any change in the character of one’s neighbor-
hood can have a quantifiable impact—either positive or negative—on local 
property values. In my hypothetical, for example, my neighbor’s well-
maintained lawn may increase my home’s value, whereas her junk-strewn 
lawn may diminish it. William Fischel details the extent of this “capitaliza-
tion” phenomenon: studies have shown that traffic congestion, high crime 
rates, large housing projects, and local air pollution decreased property 
values, while growth controls, high-quality local schools, and “[h]aving 
homeowners rather than renters as neighbors” demonstrably increased home 
values.24 Property owners, and homeowners in particular, are therefore 
keenly interested in any neighborhood change, since, for many individuals, 
the home is by far the most valuable asset they own.25 
For these reasons, neighborhoods prize the ability to bring in positive 
externalities—that is, improvements and land uses that residents believe 
will increase property values and enhance quality of life—and to keep out 
negative externalities—land uses that they believe will decrease property 
values, increase traffic and noise, and diminish quality of life. To achieve 
these ends, however, neighborhoods must somehow “internalize” the costs 
and benefits of those impacts.26 Specifically, they need the power to coerce 
landowners who benefit from positive externalities, such as the hypothetical 
well-maintained lawn, to pay for the benefit they receive.27 At the same 
time, neighborhoods require the ability to force those who generate nega-
tive externalities, such as the junk-strewn lawn, to absorb the cost that their 
 
23 For a theoretical exercise illustrating negative externalities in land use, see DUKEMINIER 
ET AL., supra note 18, at 46-50. 
24 FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 45-46; see also Ellickson, supra note 2, at 92 (asserting that the 
provision of local “public goods” will cause property values in the area to rise). 
25 See FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 8-12 (providing a range of reasons why homeowners are 
unusually concerned about and willing to take action to prevent potential harms to their homes by 
negative externalities); William A. Fischel, Why Are There NIMBYs?, 77 LAND ECON. 144, 146 
(2001) [hereinafter Fischel, NIMBYs] (reporting that the “vast majority of mature households” 
have all of their savings in their homes).  
26 See MANKIW, supra note 18, at 195-201 (discussing the problem of internalizing externalities). 
27 This question—how benefitted parties can be made to pay their fair share for benefits that 
are nonrivalrous and nonexcludable—is one of the central inquiries in public finance. See generally 
MUSGRAVE, supra note 21, at 7-8 (providing examples of developments that are profitable from a 
public, but not a private, point of view). 
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deleterious activity imposes on their neighbors.28 Over the last few decades, 
the deed-restricted homeowners association has soared in popularity 
because it provides neighborhoods with precisely these powers. The home-
owners association protects property values and community quality of life 
by charging mandatory assessments on all homeowners to pay for the 
provision of positive amenities, such as swimming pools, tennis courts, and 
gardens, and by strictly regulating the use of land to prevent negative 
externalities.29 
For many neighborhoods, however, the homeowners association is un-
available. In older neighborhoods that were developed without deed 
restrictions binding each parcel of land to a homeowners association, 
retroactively creating one is nearly impossible because doing so would 
require the unanimous consent of all the homeowners in the neighborhood. 
Economic theory postulates that obtaining unanimity in this situation 
among any group larger than a few landowners is very difficult because each 
landowner will have incentives to “hold out” from the agreement.30 For 
example, if a sufficient number of neighborhood residents are willing to pay 
for the maintenance of my next-door neighbor’s front lawn, then I might 
 
28 This second question—how to make the generator of negative externalities consider the 
costs imposed on others—is one of the central problems in land use control. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. 
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS 234-37 (1985) (describing and critiquing 
traditional empirical analyses of the relationship between externalities and zoning). 
29 See, e.g., NELSON, supra note 12, at 46, 52-55, 74-76 (detailing the increasing popularity of 
homeowners associations, the “covenants, conditions, and restrictions” through which these 
associations regulate land use, and the “public” services these associations provide). There is a vast 
literature on the virtues and vices of homeowners associations. See, e.g., EVAN MCKENZIE, 
PRIVATOPIA (1994); Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 
1519, 1521-26 (1982) (describing similarities between local governments and homeowners associa-
tions and asserting that voluntariness of homeowners associations is the key distinction between 
them); Lee Anne Fennell, Contracting Communities, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 829, 849-64 (describing 
how uniform rules in private developments make it hard for consumers to be fully satisfied with 
the developments in which they live); Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants, and Communities, 61 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1375, 1388-93 (1994) (describing some of the benefits of providing public goods 
through homeowners associations rather than local governments, including that homeowners 
associations can satisfy minority preferences and allocate resources better than local governments). 
This literature is outside the scope of the present Article, however, which focuses on the ability of 
neighborhoods to control their own externalities where forming a homeowners association is 
difficult or impossible.  
30 See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 2, at 79 (“When relevant owners and residents are hetero-
geneous and more numerous than a dozen or two, their efforts at voluntary coordination are likely 
to be beset by significant free rider problems.”); Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A 
Proposal to Replace Zoning with Private Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, 7 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 827, 833 (1999) (noting that the creation of homeowners associations in 
established neighborhoods is virtually impossible because “the transactions costs of assembling 
unanimous neighborhood consents voluntarily would be prohibitive”). 
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decline to agree, thereby continuing to enjoy the presence of the nice lawn 
without having to pay. Similarly, if a sufficient number of my neighbors are 
willing to place restrictions on their land to prevent unkempt yards, then I 
may benefit from the assurance that my neighbors’ lawns will remain 
pristine while keeping my own lot free of restrictions. The specter of this 
rogue “holdout” or “free rider” will deter otherwise agreeable landowners 
from joining the association out of fear that they will be forced to pay for a 
benefit that others obtain for free. Given the choice, most individuals in 
such a situation will opt not to join the homeowners association, even if it 
means that everyone in the neighborhood continues to suffer because of the 
inability to manage local externalities.31 This quandary can be overcome, 
according to the orthodox economic view, only by coercing unanimity 
through some sort of regulatory scheme.32  
The typical regulatory scheme used to overcome this collective action 
problem is a combination of zoning and ad valorem taxation. Through 
zoning, the municipality simply dictates the permissible land uses in each 
neighborhood without the consent of the affected landowners, thereby 
addressing the negative externality problem.33 Through ad valorem taxation, 
the municipality levies a charge on landowners in proportion to the assessed 
value of their property to pay for the benefits all municipal residents 
receive, again without the consent of the assessed, thus solving the positive 
externality problem.34 As the Introduction pointed out, this scheme has 
worked well for landowners in small, incorporated suburbs, where zoning 
can ensure a fairly homogeneous landowning population with uniform 
service needs. Landowners have been far less satisfied, however, with the 
governance of large cities, in which their clout is diminished by a more 
diverse population and a variety of strong interest groups that make com-
peting demands on municipal government.35 
 
31 This scenario is an example of the classic prisoner’s dilemma described in the economics 
literature, in which cooperation between individuals is defeated because each mistrusts the other’s 
willingness to value the collective self-interest above the individual self-interest, causing each to 
opt for individual self-interest even though all would have been better off cooperating. See 
MANKIW, supra note 18, at 355-62. 
32 See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 2, at 93 (proposing to overcome the free rider problem 
through a block-level improvement district—or BLID, inspired by BIDs—in which all benefitted 
owners would be required to pay assessments, regardless of consent); Nelson, supra note 30, at 833-
34 (proposing to overcome the holdout problem by allowing the creation of homeowners 
associations through a neighborhood election requiring less than unanimous consent). 
33 See Nelson, supra note 30, at 840-41, 844-45 (explaining how zoning is used in existing 
neighborhoods to overcome the holdout and free rider problems coercively). 
34 See MUSGRAVE, supra note 21, at 9-10 (identifying taxation as the traditional means of 
financing public goods).  
35 See supra note 2. 
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City officials, seeking to prevent tax-paying landowners from fleeing to 
adjacent suburbs, have attempted to placate those landowners by giving 
them the direct power to approve or veto neighborhood changes, freeing the 
landowners from the need to lobby city hall. Of most significance for 
present purposes, cities have devised two complementary devices that 
appear ideally tailored to satisfy landowners’ desires: (1) the neighborhood 
zoning district, which enables landowners to directly manage negative local 
externalities; and (2) the special assessment district, which empowers them 
to directly manage positive local externalities. 
B. The Neighborhood Zoning District 
The most common type of neighborhood zoning district provides that 
any landowner who desires to use his or her land in a designated manner 
(say, to operate a nightclub or tavern) must obtain the consent of the 
owners of some percentage of the land within a certain radius from the 
proposed land use.36 This type of zoning device is often referred to as a 
“one-shot deal.”37 The affected landowners cast a one-time vote on one 
proposed development. Afterwards, the district ceases to perform any 
further functions, unless another land use subject to the referendum provi-
sion is proposed for the same site. Frequently, the land use or uses subject 
to the jurisdiction of the zoning district will be something that is considered 
a “Locally Undesirable Land Use” (LULU)—that is, a land use with the 
potential to impose significant negative externalities, such as increased noise, 
traffic congestion, or decreased property values, on the surrounding area.38  
Although the one-shot deal has been most common, in principle the 
neighborhood zoning district could be constructed as a continuing govern-
mental entity. Robert Nelson, for example, has proposed that landowners 
 
36 Cf. Fred P. Bosselman, The Commodification of “Nature’s Metropolis”: The Historical Context 
of Illinois’ Unique Zoning Standards, 12 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 527, 567-72 (1992) (describing the 
earliest examples of “frontage consent” ordinances in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
Chicago).  
37 See Michael Heller & Rick Hills, Land Assembly Districts, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1512-26 
(2008) (explaining the “one-shot deal” concept and elaborating on its use in a variety of land use 
contexts, including neighborhood zoning and business improvement districts).  
38 See, e.g., Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 117-18 (1928) 
(examining a local zoning measure requiring the consent of property owners before establishing 
group homes for children and the elderly in a mostly residential zone); Shannon v. City of 
Forsyth, 666 P.2d 750, 751 (Mont. 1983) (considering a zoning ordinance barring mobile homes 
from certain residential zones unless eighty percent of nearby owners provided consent); Davis v. 
Blount Cnty. Beer Bd., 621 S.W.2d 149, 150 (Tenn. 1981) (analyzing a county resolution barring 
the sale of beer within 300 feet of residential dwellings, should the owner of one of those 
residences object). 
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within a particular submunicipal territory should be permitted to create, by 
petition, a “Neighborhood Association in an Established Neighborhood” 
(NASSEN).39 Once the NASSEN is created, landowners within the 
NASSEN’s territorial jurisdiction would have the power to vote on any 
proposed zoning changes within the district.40 Nelson’s scheme does not 
appear to have been widely adopted, although a few cities have attempted to 
delegate ongoing zoning powers to defined neighborhood groups.41  
C. The Special Assessment District 
The “special assessment district” is a device that permits a municipality 
to provide an improvement that confers a “special benefit” on property in 
the vicinity, and then to assess the benefitted property owners for the cost 
of the improvement.42 For example, if a sewer line servicing a residential 
development of fifty homes needs repair, the municipality could perform 
the repair and then assess the fifty homeowners for the cost.43 Traditionally, 
the special assessment was also a one-shot deal. The city would assess a 
one-time charge to finance a one-time physical improvement.44 Further-
more, the traditional special assessment usually provided improvements 
that were placed on or abutting the benefitted land—such as streets or 
sewers.45 In modern times, however, the special assessment has been applied 
much more broadly. For example, the assessment may finance the provision 
of positive externalities, such as sanitation or security services that generally 
benefit the assessed area, or the erection of an improvement, such as a rail 
station, that promises to increase economic activity or property values in 
 
39 NELSON, supra note 12, at 265-67. 
40 Id. at 267. 
41 See, e.g., Schulz v. Milne, 849 F. Supp. 708, 712 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (analyzing the constitu-
tionality of a neighborhood review board de facto empowered by the city to approve all new 
zoning changes); Rispo Inv. Co. v. City of Seven Hills, 629 N.E.2d 3, 5-6 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) 
(examining zoning measures requiring that proposed zoning changes be approved by both a 
majority of voters citywide and in the affected ward). 
42 For introductory material on special assessment districts, see supra note 5. 
43 For a typical example of a special assessment involving sewer lines, see Strauss v. Town-
ship of Holmdel, 711 A.2d 1385, 1388 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1997). 
44 See Reynolds, supra note 5, at 399 (describing the evolution of the special assessment from 
its origins as a “one-time fixed charge”). 
45 See Stephen Diamond, The Death and Transfiguration of Benefit Taxation: Special Assessments 
in Nineteenth-Century America, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 201, 203-06 (1983) (recounting early special 
assessments whose benefits could be easily traced to specific properties); Reynolds, supra note 5, at 
398 (noting that, traditionally, improvements paid for by special assessment had to benefit the 
assessed property “over and above” the advantage the whole community would derive from the 
improvements). 
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the area.46 In addition, the modern special assessment district may not 
necessarily be a one-shot deal, but could be an ongoing operation that 
assesses a regular charge against landowners for provision of a continuing 
service.47 One widely used modern incarnation of the special assessment 
district, the BID, requires assessed landowners to pay a recurring charge to 
an association, which then uses the funds to perform a wide array of ongo-
ing services for the benefit of the assessed landowners.48 The BID has 
traditionally operated in downtown business areas, but several scholars have 
proposed expanding the concept to allow residential areas to create, by 
petition of a percentage of landowners, an improvement district that is 
empowered to levy assessments on neighborhood residents in order to 
provide collective amenities on an ongoing basis.49 The neighborhood or 
block-front improvement district appears to have gained popularity in 
recent years.50 
A city may impose a special assessment or BID on the benefitted 
landowners without their consent, but the more common course is for a 
percentage of the nearby property owners to petition the city to create the 
assessment district.51 Even where such a petition is not formally required, it 
is rare for a city to create such a district without the approval of a significant 
percentage of the assessed landowners.52 In many cases, the city’s decision 
to create a special assessment district is subject to a referendum by a 
percentage of the landowners to be assessed (usually a majority or super-
majority).53 For special assessment districts like BIDs, which operate on an 
ongoing basis, a board of directors is either elected or appointed to manage 
the budget and operations of the district.54 Even when the board is appointed, 
 
46 Cf. Reynolds, supra note 5, at 399-400 (listing examples of benefits funded through mod-
ern special assessments, like fire protection services). 
47 Id. at 399. 
48 Briffault, supra note 2, at 517.  
49 See Ellickson, supra note 2, at 97-98, 100-01 (proposing services and regulations that could 
be administered by a local improvement district); Liebmann, supra note 12, at 351-64 (suggesting a 
number of amenities and services that private neighborhood groups could provide). 
50 See Richard Briffault, The Business Improvement District Comes of Age, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 
19, 21-24 (2010) (noting the sprouting of Philadelphia BIDs in a wide variety of residential 
neighborhoods, including low-income, minority neighborhoods). 
51 Reynolds, supra note 5, at 404. 
52 See id. (“BIDs are rarely, if ever, formed over the objection of a majority of the property 
owners.”); see also Briffault, supra note 6, at 381-84 (describing the large role existing businesses 
and chambers of commerce play in how BIDs are formed in practice). 
53 See Briffault, supra note 6, at 379-80 (describing how landowners within a proposed BID 
often have the opportunity to veto its creation if a significant fraction of them file written protests 
within a specified time period). 
54 See id. at 409-10, 413 (describing the different types of boards of special assessment dis-
tricts, from advisory to nonprofit district management associations). 
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it tends to be dominated by landowners.55 For the purposes of this Article, I 
ignore the less common variety of special assessment district in which the 
city simply imposes the assessment without the consent of assessed land-
owners. 
D. Capitalization, Coercion, and the Public Choice Regulatory Model 
The preceding sketch illustrates some of the ways in which the neighbor-
hood zoning district and the special assessment district are conceptually 
symmetrical. First, both devices provide landowners with the ability to 
manage local externalities directly. Neighborhood zoning districts permit a 
percentage of neighboring landowners to keep out (or be paid to allow in) 
an undesirable new entrant that presumptively causes them disproportionate 
harm as a result of its proximity; similarly, special assessment districts 
permit a percentage of neighboring landowners to bring in (if they pay) a 
desirable new entrant that presumptively brings them disproportionate ben-
efits as a result of its proximity. Second, both devices enable large, diverse 
cities to capture some of the governance advantages of small, homogeneous 
suburbs. Devolving direct power over a local land use change to nearby 
landowners circumvents potential interest-group conflicts prevalent in a 
diverse city by homogenizing the voting population and thereby ensuring a 
general consistency of preferences.  
The assumption that restricting the franchise to nearby landowners will 
result in a more uniform set of preferences rests implicitly on the theory of 
capitalization. According to this theory, the positive or negative impacts of 
neighborhood change will be reflected in the property values of local 
landowners whose land is closest to the proposed change.56 If all proximate 
landowners stand collectively to gain or to lose from a proposed new 
entrant to the neighborhood, they are likely to share similar views on 
whether to welcome that entrant.57 Capitalization also provides a normative 
basis for limiting the franchise to proximate landowners. Although tenants, 
employees, visitors, business owners, or others may have a stake in how the 
neighborhood manages change, capitalization theory holds that none of 
 
55 See id. at 412-13 (noting that “[b]usinesspeople, especially landowners, generally dominate 
the membership of these boards, even when that is not required by state enabling legislation” 
because an appointments process or an election process may be limited to landowners). 
56 See Thomas W. Merrill, Direct Voting by Property Owners, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 275, 294 
(2010) (“[T]he value of local collective goods is capitalized in the price of homes.”). 
57 See, e.g., id. at 298 (arguing that a proposal to create a historic preservation district has a 
fairly uniform impact on landowners’ property values and “puts everyone in the district in the 
same boat”). 
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these groups is affected as acutely as landowners, since any land use change 
will directly impact their property values.58 Both the special assessment 
district and the neighborhood zoning district rely implicitly on capitaliza-
tion to rationalize confining the franchise to landowners based on their 
disproportionate interest in proximate land use changes.59  
The most critical similarity between neighborhood zoning districts and 
special assessment districts, however, is that both devices have a strongly 
coercive component. Unanimity is rarely required for either of these 
entities to act. Rather, some percentage of a district’s landowners, usually 
those who own a majority or supermajority of the area’s property, have the 
power to impose their will on the rest. As I have stressed, orthodox eco-
nomic theory considers this coercive element to be absolutely essential in 
overcoming the collective action problem that besets the management of 
local externalities—without coercion, individual landowners will be enticed 
to hold out or free ride on the efforts of their neighbors.60  
 
58 Id. at 294. While some have argued that limiting the right to vote on land use changes to 
nearby landowners is undemocratic, defenders of such a limit answer that doing so is legitimate 
where a land use change is likely to affect property values, because landowners have a dispropor-
tionate stake in the outcome. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 2, at 90-95 (responding to “hyper-
egalitarian” criticism of landowner voting with historical examples of the practice and by 
contending that landowners bear the bulk of the benefits or costs of a board’s decisions); Merrill, 
supra note 56, at 297 (arguing that the creation of a historic preservation district has “trivial or 
speculative” effects on nonlandowners “compared to the primary benefits and costs, which are 
borne by members of the community”). Merrill further argues that limiting the franchise is 
legitimate because doing so “is likely to select a pool of voters who have a strong incentive to 
inform themselves about any issue that will have a significant impact on property values.” Merrill, 
supra note 56, at 294. This same logic informs the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence exempting 
certain “special-purpose” municipal entities from the “one person, one vote” rule of Reynolds v. 
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964) (internal quotation omitted), on the grounds that they dispropor-
tionately affect landowners. See infra text accompanying notes 95-105. 
59 On the special assessment district and capitalization, see, for example, Kessler v. Grand 
Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass’n, 158 F.3d 92, 108 (2d Cir. 1998) (“The principal economic benefit from 
[the BID’s] activities . . . plainly accrues to the property owners, who will enjoy an increase in 
the value of their property.”); Ellickson, supra note 2, at 92-93 (arguing that property owners 
should be given an exclusive franchise in a “block-level institution” charged with providing 
localized public goods, because landowners are the primary beneficiaries via capitalization). For a 
similar discussion relating to neighborhood zoning districts, see, for example, Davis v. Blount 
Cnty. Beer Bd., 621 S.W.2d 149, 152 (Tenn. 1981) (upholding an ordinance conditioning approval 
of a tavern on nearby owners’ decision not to protest the approval, reasoning that “[i]t has been 
recognized that the . . .  existence of [a LULU] in close proximity to the property of others may 
adversely affect the value of their property”).  
60 See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 6, at 394 (“The coercive assessment is essential to the BID.”); 
Ellickson, supra note 2, at 93, 107 (proposing to overcome the free rider problem through BLIDs, 
in which all affected owners would be required to pay assessments, regardless of whether they 
agreed to the creation of the district, and acknowledging that the BLID proposal involves 
coercion); Nelson, supra note 30, at 833-34 (proposing a mechanism by which homeowners 
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Ultimately, both the neighborhood zoning district and the special assess-
ment district obtain their legitimacy from a “public choice” model of local 
government. Under this model, a free market, in which individuals transact 
based on their ability and willingness to pay, is the ideal provider of virtually 
all goods and services; state coercion is legitimate only to the extent that it 
is necessary to overcome a structural incapacity of the market to satisfy 
individual preferences.61 The state, in other words, is merely a continuation 
of the market by other means.62 It exists solely to enable individuals to 
safeguard their economic self-interest where the market fails to do so.  
In the case of the neighborhood zoning district and special assessment 
district, the public choice model would consider government coercion of 
dissenting landowners a legitimate form of market substitution because 
collective action problems (of either the holdout or free-rider variety) 
frustrate the economic interests of all the neighborhood landowners by 
making it impossible for them to internalize the costs of local externalities. 
By the same token, public choice theory would rationalize the restriction of 
the franchise to landowners on the grounds that, in line with the notion of 
capitalization, the only reason government coercion is justified at all is to 
protect the landowners whose property values are bedeviled by externality 
problems. 
Given the similarities between the special assessment district and the 
neighborhood zoning district, one would expect courts to treat them 
similarly. Indeed, as we will see in the next Part, when considering the 
validity of these devices, courts have generally acknowledged the public-
choice logic underlying them. Specifically, courts have implicitly accepted 
the premise that landowners are disproportionately interested in land use 
changes or new improvements in their neighborhoods. Courts also recog-
nize that both devices are designed to enable nearby landowners to protect 
the value of their own property. However, as the next Part shows, courts 
follow these premises to diametrically opposed conclusions. The majority of 
court decisions hold neighborhood zoning districts to be constitutionally 
 
associations would be created by less than unanimous consent, thereby addressing the difficulties 
of collective action). 
61 See Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing 
Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 155-57 (1977–1978) (describing the 
public choice model and providing an example of how it applies in the context of community 
organizations). On the application of public choice theory to law generally, see DANIEL A. 
FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 
(1991); MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND 
APPLICATIONS IN LAW (2009). 
62 See Michelman, supra note 61, at 148 (“In the public choice model, . . . [t]he legislature is 
conceived as a market-like arena in which votes instead of money are the medium of exchange.”). 
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infirm because of the likelihood that landowners will make decisions based 
on their own self-interest. By contrast, almost all courts uphold the consti-
tutionality of special assessment districts in which landowners enjoy 
disproportionate power on essentially the same grounds—that their ampli-
fied voice is justified by their greater interest.  
This inconsistency has persisted in the jurisprudence, unresolved and 
ignored by scholars, because the courts have developed two entirely distinct 
doctrines to analyze these two devices. Courts scrutinize neighborhood 
zoning districts under an anachronistic “delegation” doctrine that prohibits 
the devolution of regulatory power to evidently self-interested parties. In 
contrast, courts analyze special assessment districts under a more generous 
doctrine that recognizes the practical need for municipalities to indulge the 
parochial interests of the property owners who pay the city’s bills. In short, 
it appears that the cases dealing with the neighborhood zoning district reject 
the public choice model entirely, whereas the cases dealing with the special 
assessment district accept it. These two doctrinal lines seem to exist in 
parallel juridical universes, neither one acknowledging the other or recog-
nizing their incompatibility. 
II. PUBLIC CHOICE AND THE JURISPRUDENCE  
OF NEIGHBORHOOD EMPOWERMENT 
A. Neighborhood Zoning and Standardless Delegation: Revisiting the  
Eubank-Cusack-Roberge Riddle 
The fate of neighborhood zoning districts was sealed by a series of cryptic 
Supreme Court decisions from the early twentieth century. Zoning first 
appeared in American cities in the late nineteenth century in response to 
the dual pressures of urbanization and industrialization. An exploding urban 
population and growing industrial and commercial land development 
resulted in a sharp increase in land use conflicts.63 Of particular concern to 
city leaders was the effect of new development on the stability of property 
values in existing neighborhoods with relatively uniform, low-intensity 
land use patterns, such as single-family residential districts.64 Potential 
 
63 See, e.g., SEYMOUR I. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN 74-116 (1969) (describing how chang-
ing land use patterns on Fifth Avenue in New York City threatened affluent residential and 
commercial neighborhoods, leading to adoption of first comprehensive zoning ordinance).  
64 Cf. Bosselman, supra note 36, at 569-70 (explaining that the threat of undesirable uses 
invading residential areas made homeowners nervous, and “[n]ervous neighbors were bad for the 
business of people who developed or sold real estate because the perception of security carries a 
high economic value, and nervousness lowers real estate prices”). 
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homeowners considering whether to purchase a home in such neighbor-
hoods would surely be wary of purchasing a plot of land that accrued a 
significant portion of its value from the low-intensity homogeneity of the 
surrounding neighborhood absent some assurance that the neighborhood 
would remain homogeneous—particularly during an era when neighbor-
hoods were rapidly changing due to the introduction of ever more intense 
land uses.65 To address this problem, Chicago pioneered the earliest form of 
zoning ordinance, the “block-front consent” scheme. In 1887, Chicago 
enacted an ordinance that prohibited new livery stables within 75 feet of 
any residential area unless the owners of all property within 600 feet 
consented in writing.66 The Illinois Supreme Court upheld this scheme in 
City of Chicago v. Stratton, reasoning that “[i]n matters of purely local 
concern the parties immediately interested may fairly be supposed to be 
more competent to judge of their needs than any central authority.”67 
Stratton thus appears to endorse the public-choice logic that “immediately 
interested” parties should be permitted to determine their own “needs.” 
However, the United States Supreme Court’s 1912 decision in Eubank v. 
City of Richmond68 cast Stratton into serious doubt. In Eubank, the Court 
held that a zoning ordinance enacted by the city of Richmond, Virginia, 
permitting the owners of two-thirds of the property abutting any street to 
establish a setback line for buildings on the street was an unconstitutional 
delegation of power.69 The Court reasoned that the ordinance permitted 
“one set of property owners to control the property right of others” without 
providing any limitation on those owners’ authority.70 Absent any stand-
ards, property owners could exercise the zoning power “solely for their own 
interest or even capriciously.”71 In rejecting landowners’ “own interest” as a 
decisionmaking standard, Eubank apparently repudiated the underlying 
public-choice premise of the neighborhood zoning district, which is that 
landowners should have a voice in proximate land use changes precisely 
because they are the ones most interested. 
Stratton was distinguishable from Eubank in that the ordinance at issue 
in Stratton did not permit landowners to establish a land use regulation, but 
 
65 See, e.g., id. at 570-71 (describing the threat livery stables posed to Chicago’s residential 
neighborhoods in the late nineteenth century).  
66 Id. at 570.  
67 44 N.E. 853, 855 (Ill. 1896). 
68 226 U.S. 137 (1912). 
69 Id. at 141, 144. 
70 Id. at 144. 
71 Id. at 145. 
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allowed them simply to waive an otherwise applicable restriction.72 In a 
later case also involving Chicago, Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago,73 the 
Supreme Court seemingly salvaged Stratton. The Court upheld a municipal 
ordinance prohibiting the erection of a billboard in any predominantly 
residential district without the consent of the owners of a majority of the 
frontage on the street where the billboard was to be erected.74 The Court 
distinguished Eubank by noting that the Richmond ordinance had empow-
ered neighbors to impose restrictions, whereas the Chicago ordinance under 
review empowered neighbors only to lift an otherwise applicable re-
striction.75 
The distinction between a valid waiver and an invalid imposition, tenu-
ous from the beginning, was apparently abolished in the last of the Supreme 
Court’s cases on neighborhood zoning districts, the 1928 case of Washington 
ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge.76 There, the Court considered an 
ordinance that prohibited the construction of certain types of group homes 
in areas zoned for single-family residences, but allowed this prohibition to 
be lifted with the consent of the owners of two-thirds of the property 
within four hundred feet of the proposed location of the group home.77 The 
Court invalidated the ordinance.78 Although the case more closely resem-
bled Cusack than Eubank, the Court followed Eubank in reasoning that the 
ordinance amounted to a standardless delegation—it conferred on one 
group of property owners the power to prevent others from using their land 
without providing standards to constrain that power in any way.79 The 
Court noted that the property owners were “not bound by any official duty, 
but are free to withhold consent for selfish reasons or arbitrarily and may 
subject the [plaintiff ] to their will or caprice.”80 Like Eubank, then, Roberge 
rejected the public-choice premise that landowners should be able to with-
hold consent for “selfish” reasons such as protecting the value of their 
property.81 The Roberge Court distinguished Cusack on the grounds that 
billboards—at issue in Cusack—were inherently offensive nuisances, whereas 
the record did not establish the per se offensiveness of group homes.82 
 
72 See Stratton, 44 N.E. at 855. 
73 242 U.S. 526 (1917). 
74 Id. at 527, 531. 
75 See id. at 531. 
76 278 U.S. 116 (1928). 
77 Id. at 117-18, 122-23.  
78 Id. at 122.  
79 Id. at 121-22. 
80 Id. at 122 (citation omitted). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
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Making sense of this trio of cases proves exceedingly difficult. While 
Eubank and Cusack can perhaps be reconciled, Roberge’s distinction of Cusack 
cannot withstand scrutiny. If Roberge is read to mean that cities lack the 
power to prohibit group homes in single-family neighborhoods because 
group homes are not inherently offensive, then Roberge is plainly incon-
sistent with the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Village of Euclid v. 
Ambler Realty Co.,83 decided just two years earlier. In Euclid, the Supreme 
Court made clear that zoning authority was not limited to restraining 
offensive uses but could be deployed broadly to protect the character of 
existing neighborhoods.84 If, on the other hand, Roberge’s concern was not 
with the city’s power to prohibit the use in question ab initio but rather 
with the validity of a neighborhood plebiscite on whether to waive the 
prohibition, then the Court’s distinction of Cusack, which approved a 
similar voting scheme, is inexplicable.85 In fact, it seems far more sensible 
for a city to give neighbors a vote on whether to waive a land use prohibi-
tion where the offensiveness of the use to be prohibited is debatable (as in 
Roberge) than where the use is indisputably offensive (as in Cusack). Indeed, 
the city would likely be neglecting its duty to protect the public health, 
safety, and welfare if it permitted some landowners to impose a plainly 
noxious use on their objecting neighbors. 
Not surprisingly, both courts and commentators have struggled to make 
sense of the doctrine emerging from the Eubank-Cusack-Roberge line of 
cases. The majority of courts cite Roberge and Eubank as providing the 
applicable rule that direct delegation of the zoning power to neighborhood 
groups is prohibited, and either ignore or distinguish Cusack.86 A minority of 
 
83 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
84 See id. at 388 (upholding a zoning ordinance excluding all industrial uses from residential 
districts, while recognizing that “it may thereby happen that not only offensive or dangerous 
industries will be excluded, but those which are neither offensive nor dangerous will share the 
same fate”). 
85 See Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 531 (1917) (“The ordinance in 
the case at bar . . . permits this prohibition to be modified with the consent of persons who are to 
be most affected by such modification.”). 
86 See, e.g., Schulz v. Milne, 849 F. Supp. 708, 711-12 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that the 
plaintiff stated a claim of unconstitutional delegation of zoning power to a neighborhood review 
board on the authority of Eubank and Roberge); Emmett McLoughlin Realty, Inc. v. Pima County, 
58 P.3d 39, 41-42 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Eubank, Roberge, and Cusack and holding that the 
ordinance at issue more closely resembled the invalid neighborhood-consent ordinance struck 
down by Eubank than the valid waiver ordinance upheld in Cusack); Shannon v. City of Forsyth, 
666 P.2d 750, 752 (Mont. 1983) (invalidating a neighbor-consent provision related to the location 
of mobile homes under the authority of Eubank and Roberge); Cary v. City of Rapid City, 559 
N.W.2d 891, 895-96 (S.D. 1997) (invalidating a neighbor-consent provision under Eubank and 
Roberge while ignoring Cusack); Am. Chariot v. City of Memphis, 164 S.W.3d 600, 602-03, 605 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (invalidating a landowner-consent provision allowing restaurant owners to 
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courts cite Cusack and uphold such provisions, and likewise either distin-
guish or ignore Eubank and Roberge.87 Neither group of decisions makes a 
convincing case for unifying the doctrine in this area.88 Scholars have fared 
little better. Frank Michelman, one of the most distinguished local-
government scholars, undertook an extensive examination of the three cases 
and ultimately concluded that they could not be reconciled.89 Fortunately, 
 
waive a prohibition on where horse-drawn carriages could be located and distinguishing Cusack on 
the grounds that the ordinance in this case was for the benefit of the public, while the ordinance in 
Cusack was only for the benefit of the local property owners); Williams v. Whitten, 451 S.W.2d 
535, 536, 538 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (invalidating a neighbor-consent provision respecting the 
location of mobile home parks under Roberge); County of Fairfax v. Fleet Indus. Park Ltd. P’ship, 
410 S.E.2d 669, 670, 673 (Va. 1991) (invalidating a provision conditioning zoning changes in a 
district on the consent of neighbors under Eubank and distinguishing Cusack); Town of Westford 
v. Kilburn, 300 A.2d 523, 527 (Vt. 1973) (invalidating a consent provision as a standardless 
delegation without citing Eubank, Roberge, or Cusack); cf. Gen. Elec. Co. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of 
Labor, 936 F.2d 1448, 1455 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Eubank and Roberge remain good law today.”). 
87 See, e.g., Nikolas v. City of Omaha, No. 8:08-87, 2009 WL 529226, at *8-9 (D. Neb. Mar. 
2, 2009) (upholding a city code provision prohibiting accessory apartments subject to neighbor 
approval as a waiver law under Cusack, without citing Roberge or Eubank); Coffey v. County of 
Otoe, 743 N.W.2d 632, 634, 638-39 (Neb. 2008) (upholding under Cusack a neighborhood 
“waiver” scheme permitting residences near animal feeding and waste facilities only if mutual 
easements were granted, while distinguishing Eubank and discussing Roberge in a tangential 
footnote); Rispo Inv. Co. v. City of Seven Hills, 629 N.E.2d 3, 11, 12-13 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) 
(upholding a neighborhood-consent provision under Cusack, among others, while distinguishing 
Eubank and Roberge as applicable only to city ordinances and not to city charters granted under 
home rule); Davis v. Blount Cnty. Beer Bd., 621 S.W.2d 149, 150, 151-52 (Tenn. 1981) (upholding 
under Cusack a consent provision under which a neighbor can veto a proposed permit to sell beer, 
while distinguishing Eubank and citing Roberge once in a “see also”); cf. Hornstein v. Barry, 560 
A.2d 530, 531, 536-37 (D.C. 1989) (en banc) (upholding a provision conditioning the conversion of 
apartment buildings to condominiums on the consent of a majority of existing tenants, relying on 
Cusack and distinguishing Roberge and Eubank). But cf. id. at 540 (Ferren, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that Roberge rather than Cusack is the applicable rule); id. at 542-43 (Reilly, J., dissenting in part) 
(same). 
88 There is some suggestion in the case law and other literature that the “rule” emerging 
from the Eubank-Cusack-Roberge line is that “consent provisions are valid if they waive a previously 
applicable zoning restriction, but are invalid if they impose a new zoning restriction.” DANIEL R. 
MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 6.04 (5th ed. 2003); cf. Howard Twp. Bd. of Trs. v. Waldo, 
425 N.W.2d 180, 184 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (per curiam) (stating the rule that waiver provisions 
are generally valid but holding that a provision requiring consent from 100% of neighbors was in 
any event unreasonable). This is a dubious statement of the applicable legal rule. It completely 
disregards the Roberge case, which itself invalidated a “waiver” provision and which, as the most 
recent of the three Supreme Court decisions, is likely the most authoritative. The stated rule also 
ignores the substantial number of cases cited supra note 86 in which courts have relied on Roberge 
to invalidate neighborhood waiver provisions. As a matter of principle, moreover, the distinction 
between a “waiver” and an “imposition” is imperceptible and formalistic. In either case, landowners 
are directly empowered to determine whether to permit a particular land use in proximity to their 
own properties. 
89 See Michelman, supra note 61, at 164-87 (analyzing these cases and others alternatively 
under a “public choice” and a “public interest” model, and concluding that neither satisfactorily 
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for the purposes of this Article, I need not sort out the doctrinal mess these 
precedents have created. My concern here is how, if at all, we can reconcile 
the courts’ generally skeptical attitude toward neighborhood zoning districts 
with their permissive approach to special assessment districts. Cusack may 
prove relevant for this discussion later, but for now I focus on Eubank, 
Roberge, and their progeny.  
If we take the reasoning of Eubank and Roberge at face value, the trouble 
with neighborhood zoning districts is their public-choice foundation—that 
landowners are permitted to exercise regulatory power in accordance with 
their own selfish interests rather than some conception of the public good. 
Assuming that is a legitimate concern, however, it should also raise doubts 
about the validity of special assessment districts, which likewise empower 
proximate landowners to effectuate their own self-interest. Nevertheless, 
special assessment districts have managed to evade the scrutiny of the 
Roberge doctrine because courts use an entirely distinct doctrinal framework 
to assess those devices—a framework in which the self-interest of the 
enfranchised landowners is considered a point in favor of a district’s validity. 
B. Special Assessments, BIDs, and the “One Person, One Vote” Rule 
The special assessment is of an older vintage than zoning, having been 
used since before the Civil War as a means of financing municipal improve-
ments.90 Aside from a brief, late–nineteenth century foray by the Supreme 
Court into special assessment doctrine, the area has traditionally been the 
province of the state courts.91 Federal courts again entered the fray, however, 
 
explains the Roberge trio). For a more extensive discussion of Michelman’s analysis, see infra text 
accompanying notes 190-94. 
90 See JACKSON, supra note 1, at 131 (describing the use of special assessments to fund street 
pavement in the mid-nineteenth century and later efforts to shift infrastructure costs to munici-
palities); Diamond, supra note 45, at 206-10 (explaining the factors that led to the use of special 
assessments, particularly in New York, and describing how early courts saw special assessments in 
a variety of different lights, such as examples of taxation or as private funding of private benefits); 
see also supra notes 44-45. 
91 Toward the close of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court briefly intervened in 
special assessment law to require that special assessments be supported by a fairly exacting 
calculation of the special benefits received by each landowner. See Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 
269, 290-92 (1898) (invalidating an assessment “because it rested upon a basis that excluded any 
consideration of benefits”). However, just a few years later, the Court reversed course and held 
that courts should broadly defer to legislative judgments about benefit, which it deemed “a matter 
of forecast and estimate.” Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 197 U.S. 430, 
433-34 (1905). From that time until the emergence of the “one person, one vote” jurisprudence in 
the 1960s, the federal courts largely ceded the development of special assessment law to state 
courts. See Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 
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after the Court’s 1968 decision in Avery v. Midland County.92 In Avery, the 
Court held that local governments with “general governmental powers over 
an entire geographic area” were required to apportion voting power in 
accordance with the principle of “one person, one vote”93 articulated in the 
landmark decision of Reynolds v. Sims.94 The Avery Court left open the 
possibility that the “one person, one vote” rule might not apply to “a 
special-purpose unit of government assigned the performance of functions 
affecting definable groups of constituents more than other constituents.”95 
Avery thus seemed to acknowledge that, contrary to Roberge and Eubank, 
circumstances might exist in which it would be legitimate for government to 
delegate power to individuals deemed disproportionately interested in the 
subject matter of the government regulation.  
The Supreme Court subsequently applied Avery’s exception in two cases, 
Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District96 and Ball v. 
James.97 In both cases, the Court evidently accepted the very public-choice 
premise that Eubank and Roberge rejected, affirming that the state can 
constitutionally confer regulatory power on presumptively self-interested 
landowners in proportion to their presumed degree of interest.98 In Salyer 
and Ball, plaintiffs challenged the voting structure of special-purpose 
municipal districts.99 Special-purpose districts are similar to special assess-
ment districts in that they are typically financed, at least in part, by assess-
ments on benefitted landowners; they differ, however, in that special-
purpose districts are created directly by the state as autonomously function-
ing local governmental bodies rather than as subdivisions of a general-
purpose municipality.100 The entities in Salyer and Ball were water-storage 
 
YALE L.J. 385, 472-73 (1977) (endorsing the Supreme Court’s implicit decision to leave special 
assessments to the state courts). 
92 390 U.S. 474 (1968). 
93 Id. at 484-85. 
94 See 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (“We hold that, as a basic constitutional standard, the Equal 
Protection Clause requires that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be 
apportioned on a population basis.”). 
95 390 U.S. at 483-84. 
96 410 U.S. 719 (1973). 
97 451 U.S. 355 (1981). 
98 See id. at 370-71 (citing Avery and concluding that the facts of the case “justif[y] a depar-
ture from the popular-election requirement of the Reynolds case”); Salyer, 410 U.S. at 728 (“We 
conclude that the appellee water storage district, by reason [in part] . . . of the disproportionate 
effect of its activities on landowners as a group, is the sort of exception to the rule . . . the 
decision in Avery . . . contemplated.”). 
99 Ball, 451 U.S. at 357; Salyer, 410 U.S. at 724-25. 
100 See NANCY BURNS, THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: 
PRIVATE VALUES IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS 4, 14-15 (1994) (explaining that “[s]pecial districts 
are independent local governments that generally perform only a few local government functions” 
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districts that imposed mandatory assessments on landowners who received 
water from the districts.101 Each parcel of land was assessed based on the 
benefit it was deemed to receive, and voting rights for the directors of the 
water districts were apportioned to landowners either according to their 
parcels’ assessed valuations (in Salyer)102 or acreage (in Ball).103 The voting 
schemes in the two cases were challenged for violating the “one person, one 
vote” rule, but the Court held that Avery was inapplicable.104 In both cases, 
the Court held that the water districts served only the limited purpose of 
providing water and disproportionately impacted the landowners who paid 
the assessments and whose land benefitted from receiving the water.105  
In Ball, the Court reached this conclusion notwithstanding the fact that 
the water district encompassed almost half of the population of Arizona, 
including the Phoenix metropolitan region, and that it generated and sold 
electric power as a means of generating additional revenue, thus making it a 
significant player in the overall development of an arid region.106 Neverthe-
less, the Court found that the district did not “administer such normal 
functions of government as the maintenance of streets, the operation of 
schools, or sanitation, health, or welfare services.”107 Furthermore, the 
Court held that the district’s weighted voting structure was legitimate 
because there was a “disproportionately greater” relationship between the 
district’s functions and the landowners empowered to vote within it.108 
Weighting votes based on the acreage of land owned was reasonable “since 
that number reasonably reflect[ed] the relative risks . . . landowners 
[incurred] and the distribution of the benefits and the burdens of the 
District’s water operations.”109 
Salyer and Ball thus stand for the proposition that it is constitutionally 
permissible, and indeed eminently reasonable, for government to delegate 
regulatory power to landowners who have a disproportionate economic 
interest in the subject matter of the regulation, at least when two predicates 
 
in contrast to “general purpose local governments”); KATHRYN A. FOSTER, THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF SPECIAL-PURPOSE GOVERNMENT 7-15 (1997) (describing the different types of 
special-purpose governments, their powers, and the legal bases for their creation). 
101 Ball, 451 U.S. at 357, 359-60; Salyer, 410 U.S. at 721, 723-24. 
102 410 U.S. at 725. 
103 451 U.S. at 359. 
104 See supra note 98. 
105 Ball, 451 U.S. at 370; Salyer, 410 U.S. at 728. 
106 451 U.S. at 365-66. 
107 Id. at 366. 
108 Id. at 371. 
109 Id.  
  
2013] Neighborhood Empowerment 965 
 
are satisfied. First, the entity must serve a “special limited purpose”110 
rather than a general governmental purpose; and second, it must dispropor-
tionately affect a distinct class of constituents.111 After Ball, it has been left 
to state and lower federal courts to sort out the knotty analytical problem of 
how exactly to distinguish “limited-purpose” from “general-purpose” 
municipalities, and how to determine when one group of constituents is so 
disproportionately affected by the operations of a governmental entity as to 
justify departure from “one person, one vote.” A large body of doctrine has 
therefore developed attempting to interpret and apply Salyer and Ball. For 
purposes of this Article, two decisions are particularly relevant because they 
apply the Salyer-Ball line to a traditional special assessment district and a 
BID, respectively. In doing so, these decisions expressly use public-choice 
reasoning to legitimize the regulatory mechanisms in question. 
In Southern California Rapid Transit District v. Bolen, a California agency 
created to finance and construct a rapid transit system in southern California 
was empowered to recoup its costs by creating “special benefit assessment 
districts” surrounding proposed rail stations.112 Landowners within the 
assessment districts would pay a charge based on the amount of property 
owned.113 The agency voted to create several benefit districts after deter-
mining that the landowners to be assessed would experience tangible 
benefits, such as enhanced property values, from the introduction of rail 
stations near their property.114 The law provided, however, that the creation 
of a district be subject to a referendum of the affected landowners if “the 
owners of at least 25 percent of the assessed value of real property within a 
proposed district” requested it.115 Only landowners subject to the assess-
ment were eligible to vote, and voting was weighted based upon the amount 
of property owned.116 The court held that this voting scheme was constitu-
tional under the Salyer-Ball line because it satisfied the two essential predi-
cates for exemption from the “one person, one vote” rule. First, the special 
assessment districts did not exercise any “general governmental powers” but 
were “little more than formalistic, geographically defined perimeters whose 
raison d’être is to serve as the conceptual medium for the recognition of 
 
110 Salyer, 410 U.S. at 728. 
111 Id. But see Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Govern-
ments, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 370 (1993) (critiquing the Salyer-Ball predicates and arguing that 
“[n]either criterion is analytically sound”).  
112 822 P.2d 875, 877 (Cal. 1992) (in bank). 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 878. 
115 Id. at 877 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
116 Id. 
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economic benefits conferred and the imposition of a corresponding fiscal 
burden.”117 Second, the assessment districts disproportionately affected the 
enfranchised landowners because “it is they who will most directly feel both 
the beneficial economic effects of the transit station locations and bear the 
financial burden of the annual assessments.”118  
Similarly, Kessler v. Grand Central District Management Ass’n assessed the 
constitutionality of a BID established by the city of New York in the area 
surrounding the historic Grand Central Terminal.119 Under city law, all 
property owners within the territory of the Grand Central District Man-
agement Association (GCDMA) were required to pay annual assessments 
to the GCDMA, which would use the funds to perform services within the 
district such as maintenance, security, and street signage.120 The GCDMA’s 
stated purpose was to promote business activity within the district for the 
benefit of the assessed property owners.121 The president of the GCDMA 
openly described himself as “a paid employee only of property owners.”122 
The city law provided that voting for the GCDMA board of directors was 
to be weighted based on property ownership. Specifically, the enabling 
statute required that property owners elect a majority of the board.123 Citing 
Salyer and Ball, the court found the GCDMA exempt from the “one person, 
one vote” standard.124 The court held that the district had the limited 
purpose of promoting business within the area, performed a narrow set of 
functions, lacked regulatory authority, and was subject to substantial 
governmental oversight.125 Furthermore, the GCDMA’s operation had a 
substantially greater effect on the assessed property owners than others: 
“The principal economic benefit from GCDMA’s activities . . . plainly 
accrues to the property owners, who will enjoy an increase in the value of 
their property.”126 
Both Bolen and Kessler thus explicitly rely on capitalization theory as a 
public-choice justification for the weighted voting structure of the district in 
question. The fact that landowners stood to benefit economically from the 
district’s activities legitimized their exercise of disproportionate political 
 
117 Id. at 883. 
118 Id. at 887. 
119 158 F.3d 92, 93 (2d Cir. 1998). 
120 Id. at 95-96. 
121 Id. at 104. 
122 Id. at 116 (Weinstein, J., dissenting) (quoting Douglas Feiden, Midtown Bonds Spark BID 
Controversy, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS., Apr. 6, 1992, at 1). 
123 Id. at 97. 
124 Id. at 99. 
125 Id. at 104-07. 
126 Id. at 108. 
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power, whereas in Roberge and Eubank, that same fact rendered the neighbor-
hood zoning district unconstitutional. 
C. Unifying the Doctrine? 
Kessler and Bolen, like most decisions in the Salyer-Ball line, make no 
mention of the parallel Eubank-Roberge line. Likewise, none of the cases in 
the Eubank-Roberge line ever mentions the Salyer-Ball doctrine. Superficially, 
the two lines of cases can be distinguished. In the Eubank-Roberge line, the 
plaintiffs were enfranchised landowners within the district whose land was 
subject to the district’s regulatory powers, whereas in the Salyer-Ball-Kessler 
line, the plaintiffs were primarily nonlandowners in the area who were not 
directly subject to the district’s regulatory authority but nevertheless sought 
the franchise as a matter of equal protection, thus raising a “one person, one 
vote” issue. As we recall, however, the public choice theory underlying both 
special assessment and neighborhood zoning districts holds that the con-
finement of the franchise to landowners and the ability of a majority of 
those landowners to coerce a recalcitrant minority are both mandated by the 
“market failure” justification for state action. Government coercion is 
necessary to protect property values in the face of a collective action 
problem that makes market coordination impossible, and the limitation of 
the franchise to landowners is necessary because the sole justification for 
state intervention is to protect landowners’ property values.127  
Thus, to the extent public choice theory supports the Kessler court’s de-
cision that the franchise may be legitimately confined to landowners on the 
grounds that landowners are disproportionately affected by the anticipated 
increase in property values from the enhanced services of the GCDMA,128 
public choice theory would also hold that a majority of block-front owners 
in Roberge could legitimately prevent a neighboring landowner from siting a 
group home on his property in order to overcome a collective action 
problem that could result in the diminution of property values neighborhood-
wide.129 Likewise, if the special assessment districts in Bolen were accurately 
described as “little more than formalistic, geographically defined perimeters” 
 
127 See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. 
128 See Kessler, 158 F.3d at 108.  
129 See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. It could be argued that, setting public choice 
theory aside, courts should more strictly scrutinize instances of direct coercion (Roberge/Eubank) 
than instances where plaintiffs merely claim to be affected in a noncoercive way by government 
activity (Salyer/Ball/Kessler). I discuss this distinction in detail infra in Section III.B. and conclude 
that it is not a sound basis for distinguishing the Eubank-Roberge line from the Salyer-Ball-Kessler 
line. 
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designed to serve as “conceptual medium[s]” for the recognition of a 
distinct economic impact, the neighborhood zoning districts in Roberge and 
Eubank would also fit that description.130  
Finally, if the very purpose of state action under the public choice model 
is to effectuate individual self-interest where the market proves inadequate 
to do so, then it follows that the individuals empowered to act can of course 
exercise their authority based on their own self-interest. The cases in the 
Salyer-Ball line accept this logic insofar as they permit the franchise to be 
confined to landowners with an economic interest in protecting property 
values, whereas Eubank and Roberge reject this logic insofar as they refuse to 
recognize economic interest as a legitimate basis for regulatory activity. In 
short, where the Salyer-Ball line is consistent with the public choice model, 
the Eubank-Roberge line is directly at odds with it.  
On its face, then, there is an unresolved contradiction in the jurispru-
dence. And, as William James said, “whenever you meet a contradiction you 
must make a distinction.”131 Unfortunately, the courts have never articulated 
what that distinction may be, and law review commentators have done little 
better. For example, George Liebmann has argued that neighborhoods 
should be empowered to provide a wide range of services similar to those 
typically provided by BIDs, such as law enforcement and the maintenance 
of public facilities;132 likewise, Robert Ellickson has written glowingly of 
BIDs, even advocating for the expansion of their use to residential urban 
neighborhoods outside of downtown areas.133 Ellickson endorses the BID 
because it enables landowners to circumvent the inefficient “rent-seeking” 
of big city government and directly provide themselves with desired local 
amenities.134 He further argues that restricting the franchise to landowners 
is sensible because, given the capitalization literature, landowners are clearly 
disproportionately affected by the introduction of new local improve-
ments.135 This very logic, of course, would also support neighborhood 
 
130 S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. v. Bolen, 822 P.2d 875, 883 (Cal. 1992) (in bank). Thus, the 
distinction between “general-purpose” and “special-purpose” governmental entities provides little 
help in distinguishing neighborhood zoning districts from special assessment districts. For a more 
detailed discussion of the distinction between general-purpose and special-purpose districts, see 
infra text accompanying notes 142-55. 
131 WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM & OTHER WRITINGS 24 (Giles B. Gunn ed., Penguin 
Books 2000) (1907). 
132 See Liebmann, supra note 12, at 351-64 (listing and describing services he would authorize 
neighborhood organizations to provide). 
133 See Ellickson, supra note 2, at 82-85 (describing the advantages of block improvement 
districts (BLIDs), including their small scale and tight-knit social networks). 
134 Id. at 89-90. 
135 Id. at 92-95. 
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zoning control. However, both Ellickson and Liebmann recoil at the 
prospect of conferring more than token zoning powers on neighborhood 
groups.136 Neither scholar provides more than a cursory explanation of how 
they can meaningfully distinguish neighborhood zoning districts from 
BIDs.137 Robert Nelson, the rare scholar who has actually advocated for 
neighborhood zoning control, has simply ignored the Roberge line entirely.138  
In the following Part, I look beneath the surface of both the doctrine 
and the commentary in an attempt to discern whether there is a meaningful 
distinction between neighborhood zoning districts and special assessment 
districts that may explain the contradiction. Ultimately, I conclude that 
there is no sound way to distinguish these devices. Indeed, if there is any 
valid distinction, it is that neighborhood control of zoning is far less trouble-
some as a matter of public policy than the special assessment district. 
III. PUBLIC POLICY AND NEIGHBORHOOD EMPOWERMENT 
A. The Risk of Majoritarian Exploitation 
Whenever power is delegated from a higher to a lower level of govern-
ment, it raises a concern, expressed most famously in James Madison’s 
Federalist No. 10, that a locally dominant faction may exploit a vulnerable 
minority.139 In their innovative article Land Assembly Districts, Michael 
Heller and Rick Hills use Madison’s framework to argue that both neighbor-
hood zoning districts and BIDs present a risk of majoritarian exploitation.140 
They further contend that Madison’s argument in Federalist No. 10 can help 
explain both the Roberge and the Salyer-Ball lines of cases.141 Thus, this 
 
136 See id. at 99 (proposing a statute that would give an “ordinary BLID” some authority to 
waive zoning restrictions but otherwise deny regulatory powers); Liebmann, supra note 12, at 346, 
362 (concluding that several “external effects” create a “strong case” for not giving zoning powers 
to community associations). 
137 See infra notes 266-68 and accompanying text. 
138 See NELSON, supra note 12, at 404-08 (discussing the Avery line as potentially applicable 
precedent but declining to mention the Roberge line). 
139 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) 
(developing a theory explaining why smaller societies are more likely to engender oppressive 
majorities). 
140 See Heller & Hills, supra note 37, at 1500-03 (discussing how the multiple functions per-
formed by BIDs increase the number of opportunities to exploit minority groups); see also id. at 
1521 (arguing that authorizing neighborhoods to control their own zoning would raise a strong 
possibility of “intra-group exploitation”). Richard Briffault also acknowledges that BIDs raise “the 
classic Madisonian possibility of tyranny by a majority faction.” Briffault, supra note 6, at 457. 
141 See Heller & Hills, supra note 37, at 1499 & n.83 (“Because of this worry about ‘parochial’ 
and ‘selfish’ behavior, courts have limited the power of neighborhoods to impose new zoning 
restrictions on parcels . . . .” (citing Eubank and Roberge, among others)). 
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Section considers whether the problem of majoritarian exploitation can shed 
any light on the judicial distinction between neighborhood zoning districts 
and special assessment districts. I conclude that special assessment districts 
are likely to be more susceptible to majoritarian exploitation than neighbor-
hood zoning districts, and are thus more deserving of close judicial scrutiny.  
1. The Federalist No. 10 and Neighborhood Homogeneity 
 As Heller and Hills recapitulate Madison’s argument, a large and di-
verse polity such as a big city is likely to feature a wide variety of pressure 
groups that forge shifting governing coalitions through logrolling (i.e., 
trading votes with other pressure groups). This political dynamic enables 
each group to exert some influence, but none to dominate.142 As the size of 
the polity shrinks, however, the number of interest groups also shrinks, 
thereby making vote-trading difficult and permitting a stable majority to 
consistently impose its views on a more vulnerable minority.143 This 
problem may be avoided, however, if the boundaries of the polity are drawn 
narrowly to ensure that the population has fairly uniform interests. Indeed, 
the public-choice view of local government holds that a homogeneous 
governing entity is more efficient than a heterogeneous one because it can 
directly effect the unanimous will of the public without the inefficiencies of 
vote-trading, such as conflict, bureaucracy, pork-barrel spending, and 
redistribution.144 
This Madisonian/public-choice perspective proves helpful for the present 
analysis because it is consistent with both the Roberge line and the Salyer-
Ball line. As Heller and Hills note, the Roberge and Eubank decisions 
express a Madisonian apprehension that a dominant group of landowners 
within a small polity may selfishly exploit a minority to further its own 
parochial interests.145 Likewise, the distinction drawn in the Salyer-Ball 
cases between a general-purpose governmental entity that broadly affects 
 
142 See id. at 1499 (explaining how the size of a community affects political dynamics within 
that community and leads to “vote-trading”). 
143 Id. 
144 See, e.g., NELSON, supra note 12, at 392-94 (asserting that homogeneity fosters efficiency 
whereas heterogeneity fosters conflict and redistribution); Michelman, supra note 61, at 194 
(“There is a good economic argument to the effect that the efficiency of a majoritarian fiscal 
regime is maximized when homogeneity of preferences among the citizenry is also maxim-
ized . . . .”); see also Merrill, supra note 56, at 298 (positing that delegating power to a group with 
uniform interests, such as a neighborhood, ensures that the delegation will have “little distribu-
tional impact within the neighborhood”). 
145 See Heller & Hills, supra note 37, at 1499 (“[T]he courts fear that a majority of neighbors 
will unite around the goal of restricting a nearby parcel’s uses and thereby enhance the value of the 
neighbors’ own land at the burdened parcel owner’s expense.”). 
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the public at large and a special-purpose entity that performs a narrow 
function disproportionately affecting certain constituents may reflect a 
similar public-choice logic. If a small governing entity performs a wide 
range of functions that implicates a divergence of interests, it is likely to 
cleave into opposing factions and, absent the possibility of vote-trading in a 
larger and more diverse entity, a stable majority faction may emerge. An 
entity that performs only a narrow function over which strong disagreement 
is unlikely, by contrast, does not present a similar threat that dueling 
factions will emerge. As such, the Salyer-Ball line subjects the former sort of 
entity—the small, heterogeneous entity with broad powers—to a stricter 
constitutional standard.146 Accordingly, Heller and Hills conclude that to 
the extent a governmental entity is able to homogenize interests within the 
jurisdiction so as to minimize the risk of majoritarian exploitation, the more 
likely it is to survive scrutiny under both the Roberge and the Salyer-Ball 
doctrines.147  
a. The Neighborhood Zoning District 
Let us consider both the neighborhood zoning district and the special 
assessment district under this framework. Beginning with the former, Heller 
and Hills claim that neighborhood zoning districts are problematic because  
the opportunities for intra-group exploitation are high in a neighborhood 
composed of different-sized structures serving different functions. The 
possibility that residential owners would burden commercial structures with 
onerous restrictions is matched only by the possibility that commercial 
owners would burden residential owners with noxious uses. Even among 
residential owners, the owners of large and small buildings would have 
persistently different interests that would invite intra-neighborhood 
squabbling.148 
Heller and Hills direct this criticism specifically at the scheme proposed by 
Robert Nelson. Nelson’s scheme, we recall, would enable a group of land-
owners within a neighborhood to petition for the creation of a neighbor-
hood association, which would then exercise a full complement of zoning 
powers on an ongoing basis over the entire neighborhood.149 As I address 
 
146 See id. at 1503-04 (noting the exception to the general “one person, one vote” rule for 
“special districts that are authorized to pursue only narrowly defined goals”). 
147 See id. at 1500-05 (arguing that the Land Assembly districts are immune from the prob-
lems of Madisonian exploitation because they are homogeneous and have limited powers). 
148 Id. at 1521. 
149 See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. 
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further below, Heller and Hills’s critique of Nelson’s scheme has some 
validity; however, it is totally inapplicable to the neighborhood-consent 
schemes involved in the Roberge trio for three reasons.  
First, Heller and Hills concede that the intra-group exploitation concern 
is mitigated wherever neighborhood control is limited to a “one-shot deal” 
in which the neighborhood is “not responsible for the ongoing management 
of different land uses.”150 The one-shot deal, while making vote-trading 
impossible, will also necessarily limit the ability of a dominant faction to 
exploit a minority. As it turns out, the neighborhood-consent schemes 
involved in the Eubank-Cusack-Roberge cases were all one-shot deals—
landowners were given a one-time power to vote on a proposed land use 
change within a designated proximity to their property.  
Second, the districts at issue in those three cases all had a fairly limited 
purpose. They did not have general zoning powers, but had jurisdiction 
only to resolve one discrete issue—to set building lines in Eubank, to 
authorize the construction of a billboard in Cusack, and to site a group home 
in Roberge.151 This limited authority likewise would reduce opportunities for 
conflict among landowners.  
Third and finally, Heller and Hills’s critique presumes a neighborhood 
that is relatively diverse in terms of land uses—a mix of commercial and 
residential uses or, at least, a mix of large and small residential buildings.152 
In Roberge, however, the power to approve a group home was delegated only 
to landowners in districts zoned for single-family homes.153 Given the 
capitalization literature and homeowners’ well-documented concern with 
property values, it is at least plausible that single-family homeowners would 
have generally uniform interests in excluding group homes. Thus, the 
neighborhood-consent scheme at issue in Roberge is seemingly one that 
public choice theorists would heartily endorse. 
b. The Special Assessment District 
Ironically, under the criteria just considered, all of the special assess-
ment schemes that we have reviewed—and that the courts have upheld—
would be problematic. The special-purpose districts in Salyer, Ball, and 
Kessler were not one-shot deals, but entities with ongoing governmental 
powers.154 The BID in Kessler performed a wide range of functions such as 
 
150 Heller & Hills, supra note 37, at 1521. 
151 See supra Section II.A. 
152 See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
153 Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 117-18 (1928). 
154 See supra Section II.B. 
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sanitation, security, and lobbying city government, not the relatively 
limited set of functions involved in the Roberge trio.155 Finally, the districts 
at issue in Ball,156 Kessler,157 and Bolen158 all operated in highly diverse 
metropolitan areas with a variety of land uses and demographics while 
limiting the franchise to a small subset of that diverse population. 
This combination of factors makes intra-group conflict and exploitation 
in a small governing entity almost unavoidable. This is especially true for 
BIDs because the basic function of the BID is to manage public spaces, such 
as urban downtown areas, that are regularly used by a wide variety of 
individuals with diverse expectations regarding those spaces’ appropriate 
use.159 I single out the BID here briefly because it is perhaps the most 
widely used and controversial device cities have employed in recent years to 
devolve power upon neighborhood groups.160 For BIDs, exploitation can 
occur along at least three axes: among property owners; between property 
owners and tenants; and between property owners and other users of the 
space, such as street entertainers, vendors, or the homeless.  
i. Conflict Among Landowners in the BID 
First, where there is a diversity of land uses, disagreement among land-
owners is likely to occur, even as early as the formation of the BID. The 
owners of large office buildings may feel that the BID is superfluous if they 
are “already . . . providing the supplemental sanitation and security 
services that the BID would offer,”161 while small business owners may see 
the mandatory assessments as an unwanted expense on top of already 
burdensome property taxes.162 Industrial landowners, who have little 
concern about making the area attractive for consumers, may not want to 
pay for services intended to beautify the neighborhood, while residential 
landowners “may be unable to pass on the BID’s costs to tenants or 
 
155 See Briffault, supra note 6, at 432-39 (arguing that the GCDMA in Kessler was not a 
“limited-purpose” entity in the sense meant by Salyer and Ball because it discharged far too many 
functions). 
156 See supra notes 101 & 103 and accompanying text. 
157 See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text. 
158 See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text. 
159 See Briffault, supra note 6, at 416, 429 (noting that BIDs tend to operate in older, devel-
oped commercial areas that are open to the public). 
160 See id. at 366-67; see also Frug, supra note 14, at 17 (“[T]here seems to be an almost auto-
matic answer when one seeks to create an organization to improve neighborhood life: Let’s create 
a BID.”). 
161 Briffault, supra note 6, at 384. 
162 See id. at 384-85. 
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customers.”163 Once the BID is in operation, disagreements may arise over 
its philosophy and priorities. For example, as Richard Briffault notes, there 
may be tensions between owners of mainstream businesses who seek a 
clean-cut, tourist-friendly image for the district, and owners of bars, 
nightclubs, or adult entertainment establishments, who desire to cultivate a 
more free-wheeling environment.164 BIDs may even lobby city hall for 
zoning changes that would make presently existing uses, such as adult 
entertainment establishments, unlawful within the district.165 Heller and 
Hills conclude, accordingly, that the diverse interests of landowners within 
BIDs “make for contentious neighborhood politics and result in poor 
governance.”166 They are not entities of which Madison or the public-choice 
theorists would be proud.167  
ii. Conflict Between Landowners and Tenants in the BID 
BIDs also create potential tensions between landowners as a class and 
the tenants who are typically disenfranchised. Tenants can be dramatically 
affected by the operation of a BID, often in very different ways from 
landowners.168 Because the raison d’être of the BID is to raise property 
values for the benefit of property owners, an attendant result may be 
dramatic rent increases for tenants as well as a general gentrification of the 
area. Higher rents can lead, in turn, to the displacement of “stores that 
serve poor and working class customers” by “more upscale shops.”169 
Tenants who are not forced out by higher rents will nevertheless have 
 
163 Id. at 385. 
164 See id. at 416 (“BID expenditures to cultivate a distinctive image may be in tension with 
the interests of particular landowners or businesses whose activities do not fit the image.”). 
165 See MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL 161 (1999) (discussing the 
Times Square BID’s efforts to rezone the area to prohibit adult businesses). 
166 Heller & Hills, supra note 37, at 1500. 
167 See Briffault, supra note 6, at 457 (showing how BID governance presents the “classic 
Madisonian possibility of tyranny by a majority faction”). The critique in this subsection would 
not apply specifically to the Salyer-Ball-Kessler line because those cases involved challenges brought 
by nonlandowners. However, as discussed infra note 240, the vast majority of litigation involving 
BIDs has been brought by landowners complaining about being subject to the mandatory assessment. 
168 Id. at 436 (“BID assessments . . . affect both property owners and nonowners. . . . BID 
policing strategies, social service programs, street maintenance and repairs and economic 
development activities can have a direct impact on district residents and on the quality of life in 
the district.”); see also Richard C. Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371, 448 
(2001) (“Certainly the BID’s construction of sidewalks and other public accommodations and its 
provision of private security forces, social outreach services, and sanitation services altered the 
daily lives of the people who lived there, arguably more so than the daily lives of the often-
absentee property owners.”).  
169 Briffault, supra note 6, at 474-75.  
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different priorities with regard to the expenditure of BID funds than their 
landlords will. For instance, while business owners may want to deploy a 
maximum number of security personnel during the daytime when tourists 
flock downtown, residential tenants may prefer more security during the 
evenings, when they return home from work.170 
iii. Conflict Between Landowners and Users in the BID 
Finally, BIDs’ efforts to improve urban neighborhoods often have impacts 
on users of the space who many landowners may regard as unwelcome. 
Street entertainers and food trucks, for example, threaten both to compete 
with downtown businesses for customers and to detract from the carefully 
constructed, tourist-friendly environment that BIDs set out to create.171 As 
to the homeless, there is an inherent tension between their needs to use 
public spaces for the performance of essential life functions and the BIDs’ 
mission to make public spaces attractive for customers.172 Several BIDs have 
been accused of using strong-arm tactics to harass the homeless and force 
them to leave the area.173 While many of these allegations have turned out 
to be unfounded,174 and there are those who believe that BIDs have provided 
many positive services for the homeless,175 the core interests of the BID and 
 
170 See Daniel R. Garodnick, Comment, What’s the BID Deal? Can the Grand Central Business 
Improvement District Serve a Special Limited Purpose?, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1765-67 (2000) 
(discussing a hypothetical situation in which private security employed by a BID creates greater 
costs for residents than benefits because the private security is deployed during the day when 
residents are unable to enjoy it). 
171 BIDs have led a recent effort to crack down on food trucks in the city of Los Angeles, 
claiming that food trucks are free riders on the services provided by BIDs. See Report on 
Regulation of Mobile Food Trucks from Gerry Miller, Chief Legislative Analyst, L.A. City 
Council, to the L.A. City Council 1-2 (Feb. 17, 2011) (suggesting a municipal ordinance that would 
strengthen regulation of food trucks, and discussing BIDs’ reasons for desiring additional 
regulation). My thanks to Ernesto Hernandez for drawing my attention to the Los Angeles food 
truck controversy and this document in particular. 
172 See Nicholas Blomley, Introduction to Section I: Public Space, THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES 
READER 3, 3-4 (Nicholas Blomley et al. eds., 2001). 
173 See Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass’n, 158 F.3d 92, 122 (2d Cir. 1998) (Weinstein, 
J., dissenting) (citing instances in which BID “goon squads” were alleged to have harassed 
homeless individuals); Briffault, supra note 6, at 402-03 (discussing efforts by BIDs in Portland, 
Baltimore, and Philadelphia to deal with the homeless population including morning “wake-up 
calls” for persons sleeping on the street). 
174 See Briffault, supra note 6, at 402 (noting that an independent investigation by a “leading 
advocate for the homeless” found no evidence supporting allegations that the Grand Central BID 
used physical violence against the homeless). 
175 See, e.g., id. at 404 (quoting the same advocate’s statement that BIDs provide “vitally 
important” services for the homeless). 
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those of the homeless are, at best, difficult to reconcile.176 Since landowners 
have most of the voting power in the BID and the homeless have none, the 
prospects for intra-group exploitation are strong.  
iv. Other Special Assessment Districts 
While BIDs present the Madisonian problem of majority exploitation 
rather starkly, the problem is also present on a smaller scale in the govern-
ance of special-purpose districts and single-shot special assessment districts, 
such as the one involved in Bolen.177 Special-purpose districts, even if 
limited to such issues as water storage, may affect landowners in rather 
different ways. As the dissent in Salyer noted, water districts may create 
flooding risks that impact landowners adjacent to navigable waterways far 
more than others.178 With regard to a case like Bolen, the introduction of an 
improvement such as a rail station into a diverse urban neighborhood may 
give rise to conflict between landowners with divergent interests. For 
example, while owners of residential or commercial property might favor a 
new rail station, owners of industrial property might worry that a new 
station would increase residential use in the area, perhaps leading to 
nuisance lawsuits or rezoning requests by new residents. A new rail station 
could also dramatically affect tenants, who would be forced to endure higher 
rents (as property values rise), increased noise and foot traffic, and changes 
to the character of the community.179 
 
176 See id. at 403 (noting the “tension inherent in BID programs that seek to combine the 
traditional social service goals of homeless outreach with the security and business development 
goal of homeless removal”). 
177 See S. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. v. Bolen, 822 P.2d 875, 877 (Cal. 1992) (in bank) (descri-
bing a one-shot special assessment district in which commercial land owners, but not residential 
landowners, could veto a special assessment to finance a metro rail station). 
178 See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 737-38 (1973) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (comparing the divergent interests of an absentee corporate landowner 
who tabled a motion to divert flooding in order to advance his own financial interests with the 
interests of a residential landowner with less political power in the district whose land was flooded 
as a result). 
179 The appeals court in Bolen made exactly this point and found the special assessment 
scheme invalid under City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970). See S. Cal. Rapid Transit 
Dist. v. Bolen, 269 Cal. Rptr. 147, 156-57 (Ct. App. 1990) (finding that commercial tenants will 
bear much of the financial burden “by virtue of ‘pass-through’ clauses in their leases”), rev’d, 822 
P.2d 875; id. at 156 (“Because a special assessment will not finance the entire cost of a rapid transit 
system, part of the financing burden is likely to fall on nonlandowning persons inside the 
assessment district in the form of general property taxes, sales taxes and similar measures.” 
(quoting David J. Hayes, Note, Rapid Transit Financing: Use of the Special Assessment, 29 STAN. L. 
REV. 795, 809-10 (1977))). 
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v. Comparing the Neighborhood Zoning District  
and the Special Assessment District 
In many cases, then, the neighborhood zoning district will present a 
lesser risk of intra-group exploitation than will the special assessment 
district. This is evidenced by the fact that virtually all of the legal challenges 
brought against neighborhood zoning districts have been initiated by 
landowners within the district,180 whereas special assessment districts and 
BIDs have been beset by litigation from both landowners complaining 
about their assessments181 and nonlandowners complaining about being 
disenfranchised.182 This pattern strongly suggests that the BID and special 
assessment district affect a more heterogeneous array of interests than the 
neighborhood zoning district, and thus present a heightened risk of majori-
tarian exploitation. 
This contrast should not be too sharply drawn, however. To the extent 
that special assessment districts or BIDs operate in more homogeneous 
neighborhoods, the risk of majoritarian exploitation may be limited. For 
instance, a modern trend, much hailed by Ellickson and Liebmann,183 is for 
the BID concept to be extended outside the downtown area to residential 
neighborhoods.184 If such neighborhoods are relatively uniform in character, 
residents may have fairly consistent interests in bringing in desirable 
amenities that will increase property values. Outsiders, including peddlers, 
entertainers, the homeless, and others, arguably have a weaker interest in 
accessing and exercising control over the character of these residential areas 
than they do over downtown areas that are also important public spaces. By 
the same token, neighborhood zoning districts may present a serious risk of 
exploitation if, as in Nelson’s scheme,185 a fairly heterogeneous group of 
urban landowners is given ongoing control over a wide range of zoning 
functions within the neighborhood. As Heller and Hills note, commercial, 
industrial, and residential landowners may be at odds over what sorts of 
uses are permissible.186 In addition, tenants may oppose the introduction of 
 
180 See cases cited supra notes 86 & 87. 
181 See cases cited infra note 240 and accompanying text. 
182 Salyer, Ball, Kessler, and Bolen would all fall into this category. 
183 See supra notes 132-33. 
184 See supra note 50. 
185 See NELSON, supra note 12, at 259-314 (proposing that state governments create new 
private neighborhood associations empowered to regulate zoning with less than unanimous 
consent). 
186 See Heller & Hills, supra note 37, at 1521 (“The possibility that residential owners would 
burden commercial structures with onerous restrictions is matched only by the possibility that 
commercial owners would burden residential owners with noxious uses.”). 
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land uses that threaten to diminish their quality of life while enriching their 
landlords; conversely, they may favor the introduction of land uses that bring 
down their rents, which landlords would oppose for the same reason.187 
The salient point here, however, is that the Madisonian concern about 
majoritarian exploitation provides no basis for distinguishing neighborhood 
zoning districts per se from special assessment districts. We cannot simply 
assume that neighborhood zoning districts are more likely to result in 
majoritarian exploitation than special assessment districts. Rather, either 
device may or may not present this problem, depending on how we answer 
the following questions: Is the district a one-shot deal or an ongoing 
enterprise? Is the district generally homogeneous or heterogeneous in land 
uses and demographics? Does the district serve a limited function over 
which intra-group disagreement is unlikely, or does it perform functions 
that are likely to breed disagreement among stakeholders? These questions 
can be answered only ad hoc based on the circumstances of each particular 
delegation, rather than by categorically distinguishing neighborhood zoning 
districts from special assessment districts.  
2. Preventing Majoritarian Exploitation Through Logrolling 
In addition to the foregoing, there is another ad hoc inquiry that is 
relevant in assessing the risk of majoritarian exploitation under the 
Madisonian/public-choice normative conception of local government. This 
inquiry will again demonstrate that there is often greater cause for concern 
about the accountability of special assessment districts than neighborhood 
zoning districts. 
For Heller and Hills, the problem with delegating power to the neighbor-
hood level is that shrinking the size of the polity and truncating the number 
of pressure groups makes vote-trading impossible and thereby enables a 
dominant faction to emerge.188 This Madisonian problem can be alleviated, 
we have seen, if the polity in question is sufficiently homogeneous that all 
stakeholders share relatively uniform interests.189 The problem can also be 
alleviated, however, in precisely the opposite direction: by increasing the size 
and heterogeneity of the polity. In short, even if a particular group is 
 
187 For a similar critique, see, for example, M. Paige Ammons, Book Note, Private Govern-
ance for All: A Desirable Outcome or a Cause for Concern?, 9 NYU J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 503, 512-
15 (2005) (reviewing NELSON, supra note 12) (criticizing Nelson’s proposal on the grounds that 
low-income communities would be susceptible to invasion of LULUs that could diminish quality 
of life or, conversely, gentrification that could force them to exit the neighborhood). 
188 See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text. 
189 See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
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vulnerable to exploitation by a dominant faction at the neighborhood level, 
this is no cause for concern if the neighborhood group is subject to over-
sight by an entity that is sufficiently large and diverse to permit the locally 
disadvantaged group to seek effective relief through logrolling.190 Indeed, a 
scheme of decentralization to local groups under the loose oversight of a 
larger, more diverse authority is just the sort of federalist structure that 
Madison envisioned.  
In an incisive analysis of the Eubank-Cusack-Roberge trilogy, Frank 
Michelman asserts that the divergent results in those cases may be explained 
in precisely this fashion. According to Michelman, the Court’s rulings in 
the three cases rests implicitly on the principle that the judiciary should 
defer to a delegation of power where the party presumptively disabled by 
the delegation had a fair chance of dissuading the larger delegating authority 
from devolving the power in the first instance. For Michelman, this implicit 
test reflects a 
Madisonian or Dahlian vision of coalitions that form and re-form from 
issue to issue, of legislators exchanging support here for support there in an 
ever-shifting alignment of interest groups, making plausible an expectation 
that over the long run everyone would enjoy a net balance of political gains 
in excess of losses.191 
According to Michelman, the Court may have upheld the delegation in 
Cusack (requiring neighbor consent to site a billboard within certain pre-
cincts) on the implicit grounds that the billboard industry, whose interests 
were adversely affected by the delegation, was “almost certainly a self-
conscious and very possibly a formally organized interest-group” and 
therefore “would have had a fair chance to fight their battle, to protect their 
interest, to engage effectively in political horsetrade, at the city council 
level.”192 By contrast, the interests harmed in Eubank (which gave block-
front owners the power to establish setback lines) had “no comparable log-
rolling opportunity” for “it is hard to imagine an anti-setback lobby.”193 
Likewise, sponsors of group homes for the elderly or young children (the land 
use subjected to neighborhood referenda in Roberge) “may seem less certain 
to have been an organized or organizeable interest group capable of effective 
 
190 See Michelman, supra note 61, at 172-74 (describing how logrolling can protect the interests 
of minorities in a majoritarian scheme). 
191 Id. at 173. 
192 Id. at 172. 
193 Id. 
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lobbying at the city-council level.”194 Thus, the delegation in Cusack sur-
vived scrutiny whereas the delegations in Eubank and Roberge did not.  
Michelman’s analysis proves useful in analyzing the Salyer-Ball line as 
well. The water districts in both Salyer and Ball were ultimately subject to 
control by the state, and the Ball Court noted that the plaintiffs disenfran-
chised by the Salt River District were still qualified voters in the state of 
Arizona.195 As such, they retained the ability to influence their legislators, 
“who created and have the power to change the district.”196 In Kessler, the 
court likewise stressed that the City of New York exercised substantial 
supervisory authority over the GCDMA.197  
These cases, however, look only to the theoretical availability of over-
sight and do not examine whether parties disadvantaged by legislation 
actually had a meaningful opportunity to influence a higher-level authority 
and defend their interests. Michelman’s analysis requires a clear-eyed 
assessment of the lobbying power of the group disadvantaged by the 
delegation of power. As a corollary to Michelman’s analysis, we should also 
assess the relative lobbying power of the group or groups that benefit from 
the delegation of power. A close examination of this question reveals that, 
in many circumstances, opponents of neighborhood zoning districts will 
have a far better opportunity to influence the legislative body than oppo-
nents of special assessment districts and BIDs. As such, courts should defer 
more readily to the former than the latter. 
a. The Neighborhood Zoning District 
To begin with neighborhood control of zoning, Michelman’s analysis of 
the Roberge trio correctly suggests that the relative lobbying power of 
interested groups will often be a highly fact-sensitive inquiry. Nevertheless, 
we can make some general observations. On one hand, those who advocate 
for the siting of a locally undesirable land use (LULU) in a particular 
neighborhood often face an unfavorable political environment because of 
opposition from neighbors who live near the proposed site,198 often derisively 
 
194 Id. at 174 n.93. 
195 Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 371 n.20 (1981). 
196 Id.  
197 See Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass’n, 158 F.3d 92, 106 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[E]ven 
the activities that GCDMA performs are subject to close City control.”).  
198 See, e.g., Vicki Been, Compensated Siting Proposals: Is It Time to Pay Attention?, 21 FORD-
HAM URB. L.J. 787, 788-90 (1994) (“The siting of LULUs . . . has become an extraordinarily 
difficult public policy challenge.”). 
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referred to as NIMBYs (“Not In My Backyard”).199 Because NIMBY 
groups tend to be relatively small, geographically concentrated, and intensely 
interested in keeping LULUs out of their neighborhoods, they can readily 
organize into an effective lobbying force. By contrast, those members of the 
general public who favor a LULU siting will usually comprise a larger and 
more geographically dispersed group, and individual members of the group 
will typically be far less interested in the particular location of a LULU than 
will its potential neighbors.200  
On the other hand, neighborhood groups are not always successful in 
influencing city hall. As it turns out, many LULUs have at least one very 
powerful, well-organized interest group in their corner: developers. LULUs 
such as billboards, gas stations, and nightclubs can of course be very profit-
able, so developers have strong incentives to ensure that zoning laws 
liberally permit such uses. Furthermore, developers often have a number of 
advantages over the homeowners’ groups that oppose them. Developers 
tend to be “repeat players” at city hall,201 which enables them to cultivate 
relationships with city officials and learn the often esoteric workings of city 
government.202 Development professionals maintain a variety of professional 
organizations, such as the Urban Land Institute,203 through which they can 
aggregate knowledge and resources to more effectively lobby legislatures. 
 
199 See Fischel, NIMBYs, supra note 25, at 144-45 (defining the term NIMBY, and explaining 
that opposing nearby development may be a rational reaction to uninsurable threats to homeowners’ 
largest financial asset, to wit, the home). 
200 See MICHAEL O’HARE ET AL., FACILITY SITING AND PUBLIC OPPOSITION 70-71 
(1983) (“People who think a new facility will leave them much worse off than they would be 
without it are strongly induced to take action against it; people who each have a little bit to gain 
from its completion are only weakly motivated to support it. When the losers are few in number 
and known to each other, they also have the ability to act, while a large number of beneficiaries 
cannot easily organize themselves to take action.”); Been, supra note 198, at 789-90 (noting that 
one explanation for siting problems is that “the benefits of LULUs are spread diffusely over an 
entire community . . . while their costs are concentrated upon the host neighborhood” (footnote 
omitted)); see also MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 52 (3d prtg. 1973) 
(postulating that “[s]mall groups will further their common interests better than large groups”); 
Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279, 289 (1992) (“If 
public choice has any one key finding, it is that small groups with high stakes have a dispropor-
tionately great influence on the political process.”). 
201 See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 5, at 306 (“[R]eal estate interests tend to be repeat 
players before the commissions and legislative bodies; accordingly, they may develop personal 
relationships with members that may compromise the appointed or elected officials’ ability to 
assess the worth of a particular proposal.”).  
202 See, e.g., JOHN R. LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLIT-
ICAL ECONOMY OF PLACE 62 (1987) (“Business people’s continuous interaction with public 
officials . . . gives them systemic power.” (citation omitted)). 
203 See About ULI, URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, http://www.uli.org/about-uli (last visited Jan. 
28, 2013). 
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The development industry is also supported by a matrix of ancillary inter-
ests who profit from development, including the media, the transportation 
industry, construction unions, and financiers.204 Finally, developers often 
have considerable financial resources that they can use to make political 
campaign contributions and lobby for favorable legislation.205  
Homeowners, by contrast, have few of these organizing advantages. Far 
from being repeat players in the land use process, they are typically in-
different toward local government until someone proposes to site a contro-
versial development in their backyard.206 Once that particular controversy 
passes, homeowners revert to their former, more passive state as a “sack of 
potatoes.”207 As such, homeowners generally do not form ongoing relation-
ships with city officials, do not have insider knowledge of the land use entitle-
ment process, do not create professional organizations devoted to advancing 
homeowner interests (although they may create issue-specific groups like 
“Stop the ____ development”), and do not systematically contribute to 
political campaigns to advance their interests. In addition, there are no 
ancillary interest groups who profit from preventing growth and who may 
therefore be counted on to lobby on behalf of neighborhood groups. And, of 
course, most homeowners do not possess the financial resources that 
developers have to influence legislatures. 
 
204 See LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 202, at 62-85 (describing in detail the various parts 
of the development or “growth machine” in the United States, which involves a diverse range of 
players including politicians, media outlets, utility companies, universities, and recreational 
establishments). 
205 See id. at 230-32 (discussing the importance of campaign contributions from developers in 
local elections which enables the election of “politicians sympathetic to development”); Ellickson, 
supra note 91, at 407-08 (“With the possible exception of municipal labor unions, land-
development interests appear to be the largest investors in municipal politics in the United 
States.”). 
206 See, e.g., LOGAN & MOLOTCH, supra note 202, at 134 (noting that “urban residents are 
“naturally disorganized,” whereas business elites are “naturally organized”); Norman I. Fainstein 
& Susan S. Fainstein, Regime Strategies, Communal Resistance, and Economic Forces (describing 
neighborhood groups as “[v]ulnerable to cooptation, highly disaggregated, leadership-dominated 
and episodic in intensity,” and concluding that “they will never be the formulators of state policy 
but can only react to it”), in SUSAN S. FAINSTEIN ET AL., RESTRUCTURING THE CITY: THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF URBAN REDEVELOPMENT 245, 274 (1983); Tracy M. Gordon, 
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Ballot Box: Causes and Consequences of Local Voter Initiatives, 141 PUB. 
CHOICE 31, 33-34 (2009) (describing the free rider challenges that homeowners may face in 
organizing to influence city government). 
207 See MIKE DAVIS, CITY OF QUARTZ: EXCAVATING THE FUTURE IN LOS ANGELES 
209-10 (1990) (noting Marx’s depiction of the French peasantry as “a sack of potatoes” and arguing 
that homeowners who oppose growth are “basically peasant potatoes whose ‘natural’ scale of 
protest is disaggregated nimbyism”). 
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Perhaps most importantly, city governments are predisposed to look 
favorably upon new development that promises to contribute to municipal 
tax bases depleted by interlocal competition, diminished government 
subsidies, urban disinvestment, and tax revolts.208 Many cities are in a 
seemingly constant state of fiscal crisis that requires them to approve new 
development to compensate for a diminished tax base.209 This fiscal pressure 
gives developers yet another advantage in the fight for influence at city hall.  
How can we reconcile the evidence that homeowners have near veto 
power over the siting of LULUs with the evidence that developers truly 
hold the reins of municipal politics? In truth, many factors determine the 
relative strength that neighborhood groups possess in local politics vis-à-vis 
developers. Two important factors are the size and heterogeneity of the 
municipality in question. As William Fischel argues, in small suburban 
communities where homeowners comprise the vast majority of the voting 
population, developers may well be reduced to “supplicants.”210 In larger, 
more heterogeneous cities, however, homeowners are only one of many 
interest groups, and developers’ organizational advantages may give them 
the edge.211  
Another important factor, hinted at in Michelman’s analysis, is whether 
the LULU in question offers a net contribution to or a net drain on the local 
tax base. Tax-generating uses, such as nightclubs, shopping centers, or waste 
facilities, will likely enjoy a more favorable reception at city hall than tax-
draining uses such as low-income housing or group homes.212 The empirical 
 
208 See, e.g., Jonathan Schwartz, Note, Prisoners of Proposition 13: Sales Taxes, Property Taxes, 
and the Fiscalization of Municipal Land Use Decisions, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 183, 184-86, 198-202 
(1997) (arguing that increased limits on municipal taxing power has driven a “rush to generate 
increased sales taxes by bringing shopping centers and large discount retailers to town”). 
209 See id. at 198-202 (discussing pressures on municipal governments that lead them to pro-
mote land uses that will generate sales tax). 
210 FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 16; see also id. at 4 (stating that homeowners “are the most 
numerous and politically influential group within most localities”); id. at 15-16 (noting that though 
developers are not powerless in smaller jurisdictions, their influence is limited because local 
officials are “responsive to voters whose local economic stake is in the value of their homes and 
only indirectly in the value of new development”). 
211 See FISCHEL, supra note 28, at 212-14 (noting that in cities, the larger number of residents 
and political issues create “[a]mple opportunity . . . for special interests to influence political 
outcomes by lobbying officials, advertising about particular issues, or electioneering for candidates 
who favor their interests”). 
212 See Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1134-36 (1996) (discussing a political economy that causes municipalities to 
“attract new residents and firms that add more to the per capita tax base than they will cost in 
local services” and to “exclude new residents and activities that cost more . . . than they 
contribute in tax base”); Richard Schragger, Consuming Government, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1824, 
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evidence lends some support to this notion. A prominent study of five cities 
that had conferred some land use authority on neighborhood groups found 
that cities tended to defer to neighborhoods on most land use matters213 
except where the development in question was a significant source of 
revenue. Revenue-generating projects were nearly always approved regard-
less of neighborhood opposition.214 According to the authors, when “jobs 
and sizable tax revenues are at stake, city hall will use the resources at its 
command to see that the proposals come to fruition.”215  
Although it is difficult to draw general conclusions, the foregoing discus-
sion suggests that, at least in some circumstances, cities’ fiscal concerns and 
the strong influence of developers will induce cities to closely monitor 
neighborhoods’ exercise of the zoning power, thus minimizing the risk of 
majoritarian exploitation and, concomitantly, the need for close judicial 
scrutiny of neighborhood zoning districts.  
b. The Special Assessment District 
Ironically, these same factors—cities’ fiscal concerns and the influence of 
developers—strongly suggest that cities will not closely monitor the activi-
ties of special assessment districts and BIDs, and therefore that these 
entities warrant stricter judicial scrutiny than neighborhood zoning dis-
tricts. If cities have incentives to ensure that revenue-generating projects 
are approved despite neighborhood opposition, they have even greater 
incentives to outsource the provision and financing of municipal functions 
such as security and maintenance to quasi-privatized entities that can relieve 
the city of the need to finance such services.216 Likewise, the influential 
development interests that are often disadvantaged by the devolution of 
zoning power to neighborhood groups are likely to be strong advocates of 
special assessment districts and BIDs, which promise to boost the value of 
their property and increase economic activity in the area.217  
 
1834-47 (2003) (reviewing FISCHEL, supra note 1) (criticizing the political economy of suburbs in 
which homeowners have incentives to exclude undesirable uses such as affordable housing). 
213 See BERRY ET AL., supra note 8, at 141 (noting that “the neighborhood associations had an 
unusually good [win-to-loss] ratio, winning half the issues they initiated and losing none”). 
214 Id. at 142-44. 
215 Id. at 144. 
216 See Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass’n, 158 F.3d 92, 131 (2d Cir. 1998) (Weinstein, 
J., dissenting) (“BIDs decrease both the need and the incentive for the City to expand or maintain 
the general municipal services it provides to the City as a whole.”); Briffault, supra note 6, at 395, 
424-25 (discussing how BIDs reduce the need for city governments to expend public money on 
business interests). 
217 See Briffault, supra note 6, at 425 (noting that BIDs are viewed as “a means of attracting 
and retaining business”). 
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Here, I focus again on BIDs before returning to consider other types of 
special assessment districts. The primary advocates of many BIDs are 
highly influential, well-organized downtown business interests. BIDs often 
draw the support of the wealthiest landowners in the city, who, “because of 
their prominence, . . . have greater access to elected officials and signifi-
cant opportunity to influence them.”218 Daniel Garodnick discusses one 
chilling example of a BID’s influence on city policy. From 1992 to 1993, 
New York City fired hundreds of sanitation workers and drastically reduced 
its street-cleaning schedule as part of an austerity measure during a fiscal 
crunch.219 Because BIDs picked up the slack in wealthier areas of the city, 
“no pressure [came] from the city’s most influential citizens, and the former 
street-cleaning schedule was never restored.”220 
The very act of creating a BID takes a massive amount of resources and 
organizational capacity.221 Once created, BIDs have the capacity to forge 
their constituent landowners into an even more potent lobbying force. The 
assessments that BIDs collect from landowners may be used not only to 
provide services, but to press for favorable regulatory action from city 
hall.222 In other words, when cities delegate to BIDs the ability to collect 
mandatory assessments from all neighborhood landowners, they thereby 
enable BIDs to exert continuing influence over city officials. And BIDs have 
not been shy about flexing their muscle. They lobby forcefully for new laws 
and enforcement of existing laws to advance their interests, such as legisla-
tion targeting street vendors, adult businesses, and the homeless.223 
Consider, by contrast, the lobbying power of those who may be dis-
advantaged by the creation or operation of a BID. As detailed previously, 
those most likely to be harmed are 1) landowners who dissented from the 
decision to create the district and are forced to pay the assessment against 
their will; 2) disenfranchised residential or commercial tenants; 3) unwanted 
visitors such as street vendors, beggars, or the homeless; and 4) members of 
the general public whose interests in the use of public space diverge from 
those of the BID. As a general matter, it is reasonable to conclude that none 
 
218 Garodnick, supra note 170, at 1763. 
219 See id. (citing Moshe Adler, Why BID’s Are Bad Business, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2000, at 
CY17). 
220 Id. (quoting Adler, supra note 219). 
221 See Briffault, supra note 6, at 383 (“The creation of a BID usually requires proponents to 
invest considerable time, energy, and funds.”). 
222 See id. at 441 (describing how tax funding gives BIDs advantages over other community 
organizations, including the capacity to pressure city government to take action against undesir-
able private activity, or to increase enforcement of existing regulation). 
223 See id. at 427-28. 
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of these groups can match the organizational and resource advantages of the 
BID and its supporters. The dissenting landowners, while they may be 
influential business leaders, were obviously insufficiently influential to block 
the formation of the BID. Tenants are typically difficult to organize because 
they tend to be more transient and have less of a financial stake than 
landowners.224 Individuals such as street peddlers, beggars, and the home-
less are likely to lack the organizational capacity, professional connections, 
resources, profit motive, or congruence of interest to effectively lobby city 
hall against the geographically concentrated, homogeneously interested, 
amply financed, highly motivated, and well-organized business interests 
that support BIDs. Likewise, compared to BID proponents, individual 
members of the public at large are likely too diffuse, heterogeneous, dis-
organized, and weakly interested in access to public space to mount an 
effective fight against the BID.225 
As a result of all the foregoing, although most state laws provide for city 
oversight of BIDs, in practice BIDs have a considerable degree of autonomy. 
City governments exercise little supervision over BIDs’ day-to-day 
affairs.226 While there have been some instances in which city governments 
have constrained BIDs—particularly a dispute of unknown provenance in 
1998 between Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and New York City’s most prominent 
BID, the Grand Central Partnership (GCP)227—BIDs nevertheless exercise 
a substantial degree of independence.228 At a minimum, then, there is 
reason to be leery that cities will exercise close oversight of BIDs. 
If I have singled out BIDs for criticism here, a word should also be said 
about the special-purpose districts involved in Salyer and Ball. Special-
purpose districts, though created at the state rather than the municipal 
level, raise many of the same exploitation concerns as BIDs. The creation of 
a special-purpose district, like the creation of a BID, requires organization 
 
224 See Clayton P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon’s Rule, or, Can Public Choice Theory Justify 
Local Government Law?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 959, 987-88 (1991) (listing reasons why tenants 
face “substantial obstacles to collective action”); see also Fischel, NIMBYs, supra note 25, at 145 
(noting that homeowners vote in municipal elections fifty percent more frequently than renters do). 
225 Cf. Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid 
Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1194-1200 (1996) (discussing the collective 
action problem that prevents individual users of urban space from acting to prevent aggressive 
panhandling). 
226 See Briffault, supra note 6, at 410 (“The city government is likely to leave the BID’s day-
to-day operations to the [district managing association].”). 
227 See Garodnick, supra note 170, at 1757-59. 
228 See Briffault, supra note 6, at 439-42, 456-57 (“BIDs have considerable autonomy in prac-
tice. Although the city government plays a central role in the process of BID formation, the city’s 
involvement often drops off sharply once the BID is in operation.” (footnote omitted)). 
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and a huge expenditure of resources.229 Like BIDs, special districts are most 
often established as a result of pressure from well-organized developers and 
other business interests looking to finance infrastructure and services for 
growth.230 These groups are able to circumvent opposition by strategically 
drawing the district boundaries and by limiting the district functions to a 
specialized purpose that the public perceives as technical and apolitical.231 
As a result, opposition to special-purpose districts tends to be weak and 
disorganized.232 
In summary, BIDs and special assessment districts often raise greater 
concerns about intra-group exploitation than do neighborhood zoning 
districts. As before, however, this point should not be stated without 
qualification. If the district in question is a “one-shot deal,” it is less likely 
to form an organized interest group than a district that is empowered to act 
on an ongoing basis. Furthermore, improvement districts located outside 
downtown areas, such as in residential neighborhoods, may be less likely to 
draw support from well-heeled downtown interests, and will raise fewer 
concerns about access to public space. Thus, in any particular case, an ad 
hoc inquiry will be necessary to determine whether a group disadvantaged 
by a delegation of power has sufficient influence at the citywide level to 
mitigate fears of majoritarian exploitation. 
B. “Regulation” or “Supplemental Services”? 
I previously mentioned that one distinction between the Eubank-Roberge 
line and the Salyer-Ball line is that the former group of cases involved 
challenges by enfranchised landowners who were subject to the districts’ 
regulatory authority, whereas the latter cases involved challenges by 
nonlandowners who were not directly subject to the districts’ coercive 
 
229 See BURNS, supra note 100, at 16-22, 75-108 (describing the collective action problems 
involved in the creation of special-purpose districts). 
230 See id. at 25-32. 
231 See FOSTER, supra note 100, at 103-04 (arguing that special-purpose districts help devel-
opers avoid opposition to their projects because these districts enjoy “low political visibility, wide 
administrative discretion, financial reach, geographic flexibility, and functional specialization”). 
232 Bolen, admittedly, is a trickier case. On one hand, we could readily surmise that bringing 
high-speed rail to downtown Los Angeles was likely a priority for Los Angeles’s business and 
political elite, while principally antagonizing the less powerful industrial property owners and 
residential or commercial tenants. Hence, Bolen raised the specter of a well-organized interest 
group exploiting a less influential minority. On the other hand, however, high-speed rail is often 
politically difficult to implement because of opposition from NIMBY homeowners. See, e.g., 
Special Report: Linear, THE SAINT INDEX (2011), http://saintindex.info/special-report-linear 
(surveying homeowner attitudes toward development and concluding that “linear” developments 
like high-speed rail are hardest to site because of opposition from NIMBYs and other groups). 
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authority but sought the franchise on the grounds that the districts’ activi-
ties affected them.233 While I dismissed this distinction as irrelevant from 
the standpoint of public choice theory, it could be argued that, setting 
public choice theory aside, courts should more strictly scrutinize instances 
where plaintiffs have been directly subject to a district’s coercive authority 
(Eubank/Roberge) than where they have not (Salyer/Ball). 
On a close reading, the case law and literature appear consistent with 
this argument. For example, where the Eubank Court observed that the 
Richmond zoning ordinance empowered one set of owners to determine 
“the kind of use which another set of owners may make of their property,”234 
the Ball Court stressed that the Salt River district “cannot enact any laws 
governing the conduct of citizens”235 and that it “does not and cannot 
control the use to which the landowners who are entitled to the water 
choose to put it.”236 Similarly, the Kessler court emphasized that the GCDMA 
“ha[d] no authority to enact or enforce any laws governing the conduct of 
persons present in the district” or any other regulatory authority.237 Implic-
itly, then, the courts may be making the entirely sensible point that an 
entity that engages in coercive regulation should be subject to stricter 
constitutional constraints than one that merely provides services in a non-
coercive way.  
Commentators have also stressed the distinction between the regulatory 
powers of zoning authorities and the noncoercive service-providing powers 
of special assessment districts. For example, in an official report describing 
California’s special-purpose districts, the California Senate Local Govern-
ment Committee claimed that “general purpose” municipalities (i.e., cities 
that exercise the zoning power) are distinct from “limited purpose” munici-
palities (such as water districts) because the former are empowered to 
“regulate private behavior,” whereas the latter have only the power to “‘do 
things,’ like building public works projects such as parks and sewers.”238 
Similarly, in his proposal to create “block level improvement districts” 
(BLIDs, inspired by BIDs), Robert Ellickson distinguishes the “supplemen-
tary” services he would authorize those districts to provide, such as sanitation 
 
233 See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text. 
234 Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 143 (1912). 
235 Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 366 (1981). 
236 Id. at 367-68. 
237 Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass’n, 158 F.3d 92, 104 (2d Cir. 1998). 
238 CAL. STATE SENATE LOCAL GOV’T COMM., WHAT’S SO SPECIAL ABOUT SPECIAL 
DISTRICTS? A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO SPECIAL DISTRICTS IN CALIFORNIA 3 (4th ed. 2010), 
available at http://www.calafco.org/docs/Special_Districts/Whats_So_Special.pdf. 
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or capital improvements, from “regulatory powers,” such as neighborhood 
zoning, as to which he is far more skeptical.239 
As before, however, this distinction between the coercive powers of 
neighborhood zoning districts and the noncoercive powers of special 
assessment districts proves false. First, while cases like Salyer and Ball 
involved “one person, one vote” challenges brought by nonlandowners, the 
vast majority of litigation involving special assessments, particularly BIDs, 
has in fact been brought by landowners or business owners who voted 
against the creation of the district but were outvoted by a majority of their 
neighbors and thus forced to pay mandatory assessments against their 
will.240 These cases, then, presented precisely the same concern as the 
Roberge line—a majority of landowners within a territorially-defined district 
was empowered to coerce a dissenting minority. Nevertheless, these cases 
all uphold the validity of BID assessments without citing the Roberge line.241 
Second, although BIDs and special assessment districts do not formally 
coerce nonlandowners, they exercise strong de facto coercive authority over 
nonlandowners within the area. Thus, the Salyer-Ball line cannot be meaning-
fully distinguished from the Eubank-Roberge line on this basis. In the 
remainder of this section, I elaborate on each of the two arguments presented 
here.  
1. Landowner Challenges 
The distinction Ellickson draws between the “supplementary” services 
provided by special assessment districts and the “regulatory” activities 
undertaken by neighborhood zoning districts fails because special assessment 
 
239 See Ellickson, supra note 2, at 96-99 (advocating BLIDs that would perform a wide range 
of supplementary services but have only limited regulatory powers such as the granting of a 
zoning variance). In his landmark article on BIDs, Richard Briffault also states that BIDs do not 
“regulate.” See Briffault, supra note 6, at 407-08 (“BIDs are rarely, if ever, authorized to regulate 
the activities of district landowners, merchants, or residents directly.”). 
240 See, e.g., McGowan v. Capital Ctr., Inc., 19 F. Supp. 2d 642, 644-45 (S.D. Miss. 1998) 
(landowners challenging an assessment levied by a landowner-created BID); Evans v. City of San 
Jose, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601, 602-03 (Ct. App. 1992) (business owner challenging an assessment of a 
business owner–supported BID); Jensen v. City & County of Denver, 806 P.2d 381, 383 (Colo. 
1991) (en banc) (same); City of Seattle v. Rogers Clothing for Men, Inc., 787 P.2d 39, 41-42 
(Wash. 1990) (en banc) (business owners challenging an assessment levied by a business owner–
created BID). 
241 I discovered only one case in which a court considered a special assessment district to 
raise a delegation question under Eubank and Roberge, and, even there, the reference to Eubank and 
Roberge appeared only in a partial concurrence. See Tex. Boll Weevil Eradication Found., Inc. v. 
Lewellen, 952 S.W.2d 454, 488 (Tex. 1997) (Hecht, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, 
and concurring in the judgment) (concurring in the invalidation of a special assessment district as 
an improper delegation and citing Roberge and Eubank).  
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districts do regulate just as surely as neighborhood zoning districts do. 
While the primary function of the special assessment district is to provide 
services, that function would be impossible to carry out if the district did 
not also possess one critical “regulatory” power: the ability to coerce all 
landowners within its territorial jurisdiction to pay a mandatory assessment 
to defray the cost of a service provided regardless of whether those land-
owners desire the service. As discussed previously, and as Ellickson himself 
acknowledges, the element of coercion is essential to the success of the 
special assessment district, as it is to the neighborhood zoning district, in 
order to overcome the collective action problem that entices landowners to 
free ride.242 Thus, as I have noted, most of the litigation regarding special 
assessments and BIDs has in fact been brought by landowners complaining 
about having to pay a mandatory assessment imposed upon them by a 
majority vote of their neighbors.243  
Although both special assessment districts and neighborhood zoning 
districts are predicated on coercive regulation, a skeptic might nevertheless 
argue that a mere requirement to pay money is not nearly as onerous an 
encroachment upon one’s property rights as the deprivation of a landowner’s 
ability to determine the appropriate use of his or her land. However, a 
special assessment is not simply a requirement to pay money. The imprimatur 
of government authority makes it far more potent: a special assessment is a 
lien on one’s land, meaning that it runs with the land, binds subsequent 
purchasers, and can result in foreclosure if unpaid.244 In some states, a 
delinquent special assessment lien becomes a personal liability of the 
landowner, which may be satisfied from the landowner’s wages or other 
assets.245 
Indeed, at common law, courts considered an affirmative burden upon 
one’s land, such as a covenant to pay money, to be a far more severe restraint 
 
242 See Briffault, supra note 6, at 394 (“The coercive assessment is essential to the BID.”); 
Ellickson, supra note 2, at 93 (proposing to overcome the free rider problem through a BLID in 
which all benefitted owners would be required to pay assessments, regardless of consent); id. at 107 
(acknowledging that the BLID proposal may constitute a “threat to freedom because it would not 
be created by unanimous consent of the governed”).  
243 See supra note 240. 
244 See, e.g., OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., HANDBOOK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 
§ 99, at 352 (2d ed. 2001) (“Where assessments are not paid on time the usual method of 
enforcement is a lien on the property benefited.”); Briffault, supra note 6, at 393 (listing various 
consequences of failing to pay an assessment including delinquency sale and filing of a lien). 
245 See REYNOLDS, supra note 244, § 99. 
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on land ownership than a negative restriction on that land’s use.246 Until 
modern times, courts refused to enforce affirmative covenants against 
successors who had not expressly contracted for such an obligation, while 
freely enforcing negative servitudes against subsequent purchasers with 
notice.247 In the courts’ view, a negative restriction limits a landowner’s 
potential investment loss to the value of the land itself. The landowner can 
simply walk away from the property if it turns out to be an unwise invest-
ment. An affirmative obligation, by contrast, endures even if the land 
becomes worthless, putting all the landowner’s assets at risk.248 Although 
affirmative covenants that run with the land are now generally enforce-
able,249 courts remain wary about affirmative obligations and frequently 
refuse to enforce affirmative covenants they perceive as overly burdensome.250 
Judicial intuitions about the burdens of affirmative obligations are fre-
quently confirmed in the special assessment context. In fact, as previously 
observed, the vast majority of lawsuits concerning special assessment 
districts are brought by assessed landowners complaining about having to 
pay the assessment.251 Although special assessments tend to be relatively 
small compared to property taxes, landowners often complain that they are 
excessive when added to the existing burden of mortgage payments, home-
owners association fees, homeowners insurance, and property taxes—the 
latter of which figure to grow even larger if the special assessment district 
 
246 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 18, at 873 (explaining that an affirmative covenant 
“may impose a large personal liability on a successor” while a negative covenant “limits the 
successor’s loss to the investment in the land itself”). 
247 See id. at 873-74, 892-95 (describing uses that illustrate the contrasting positions courts 
took on affirmative covenants and negative covenants). 
248 Id. A particularly chilling case is Pocono Springs Civic Ass’n v. MacKenzie, 667 A.2d 233 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). In that case, the appellants unknowingly bought property within a 
homeowners association that was incapable of development because the lot did not meet township 
sewage requirements. Id. at 234. The appellants attempted several times without success to 
relinquish the property by sale, abandonment and foreclosure. Id. at 235. The court held that, as 
the title owners, the appellants remained personally liable for the annual homeowners association 
assessments even though their land had become worthless. Id. at 235-36. 
249 See, e.g., Neponsit Prop. Owners’ Ass’n v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793, 
795, 798 (N.Y. 1938) (holding that an affirmative covenant obligating owners to pay annual 
assessment to a homeowners’ association runs with the land and binds subsequent purchasers with 
notice). The Restatement of Property likewise provides that almost all affirmative and negative 
covenants are enforceable. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.2 (2000). 
250 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 18, at 873 (discussing an “illustrative” case in which 
a California court refused to enforce an affirmative covenant requiring a successor to rebuild and 
maintain a golf course that had fallen into disrepair).  
251 See Briffault, supra note 6, at 446 (noting that most litigation against BIDs is filed by 
property owners who feel that their BID assessments are too burdensome). 
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fulfills its promise to increase property values.252 In addition to the unwanted 
financial burden, many landowners believe that they receive no real value 
from a special assessment that has been forced upon them for the benefit of 
others. For example, a business owner who has recently invested in an 
expensive security system might oppose paying for additional security 
services.253 Worse, a special assessment may force a landowner to pay for 
services that actually harm her personal interests. For instance, a home-
owner may be charged an assessment for road improvements that threaten 
to flood her own property.254 The owner of an adult business may pay 
mandatory assessments to a BID, only to find that the BID is using the 
assessed funds on a lobbying campaign to make adult businesses illegal in 
the district.255  
There is no doubt that many zoning restrictions are just as onerous, if 
not more so, than special assessments. However, a landowner aggrieved by 
an abusive zoning law at least has the opportunity to seek judicial relief 
through the Federal Takings, Due Process, Equal Protection, Freedom of 
Speech, or Free Exercise of Religion Clauses, as well as state law doctrines 
like nonconforming use or vested rights.256 While many property rights 
advocates have complained about the ineffectiveness of some of these 
doctrines,257 landowners still enjoy far more protection against adverse 
zoning changes than they do against unwanted special assessments. As to 
the latter, courts defer very broadly to determinations about who is subject to 
a special assessment, and how much they should be assessed.258 Federal 
 
252 See id. at 384-85. 
253 See, e.g., id. at 384 (providing the example of landowners who may “already be providing 
the supplemental sanitation and security services that the BID would offer”). 
254 See, e.g., Herón Márquez Estrada & Joy Powell, Project Produces a Street Fight, STAR 
TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul) (Mar. 5, 2011), http://www.startribune.com/local/south/117275103. 
html (describing a lawsuit by residents required to pay for a street improvement project that is 
flooding their properties). 
255 See Briffault, supra note 6, at 406-07, 427 (noting that some BIDs lobby city governments 
“for new laws or the enforcement of existing laws against . . . shops that sell pornography”).  
256 For an overview of landowners’ major avenues for challenging zoning ordinances, see 
generally ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 5, at 125-232. 
257 See generally, e.g., Erin O’Hara, Property Rights and the Police Powers of the State: Regulatory 
Takings: An Oxymoron? (arguing that Supreme Court’s regulatory takings doctrine does not 
provide much protection for property rights), in LAND RIGHTS: THE 1990S’ PROPERTY 
RIGHTS REBELLION 31 (Bruce Yandle ed., 1995). 
258 See REYNOLDS, supra note 244, § 99 (“It is often held to be within the legislative discre-
tion of the local governing authorities as to . . . when to use special assessments against particular 
properties.”).  
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courts have long abandoned any solicitude for landowners complaining 
about assessments.259 
2.  Nonlandowner Challenges 
What has been said thus far concerns only the impacts that BIDs and 
special assessment districts have upon landowners. By contrast, the Salyer-
Ball line involved challenges brought by nonlandowners who were not 
directly subject to the districts’ power to coerce mandatory assessments. 
Arguably, then, it would be inappropriate to analogize these cases to the 
Eubank-Roberge line, which involved landowner challenges to the coercive 
authority of neighborhood zoning districts.  
The previous Section showed, however, that BIDs and special assess-
ment districts have significant impacts on nonlandowners within their 
territories, impacts that are in fact qualitatively similar to the coercive 
effects of zoning regulations. Like zoning regulations, for example, BIDs 
actively manage public space in a way that can substantially affect residents’ 
quality of life, such as sparking rent increases, changes in local retail options, 
or other alterations to neighborhood character.260 Through their manage-
ment of public space, furthermore, BIDs can entice desirable populations 
such as tourists, and drive away undesirable people such as food vendors or 
the homeless. Ellickson goes so far as to state that “the control of disorderly 
street people” is one of the BID’s “central functions.”261 Richard Schragger 
accordingly argues that despite Kessler’s description of the BID as an 
innocuous provider of aesthetic services that affect only landowners, BIDs 
engage actively in “defining and delineating the contours of public space 
itself.”262 Thus, while BIDs may not possess formal regulatory powers over 
nonlandowners, they have strong de facto authority over nonlandowners, 
and using that authority is one of their major reasons for being.263 
 
259 See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 197 U.S. 430, 432-35 
(1905) (holding that an assessment for a street improvement did “not go beyond the bounds set by 
the Fourteenth Amendment”); see also French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U.S. 324, 343 
(1901) (asserting that assessments are generally constitutional and noting that it is up to the 
legislature to determine how to appropriately distribute the burdens of the assessment across 
landowners). 
260 See supra subsection III.A.1.b.iii. 
261 See Ellickson, supra note 225, at 1199. 
262 Schragger, supra note 168, at 457; see also id. at 449-50 (arguing that the Kessler court ig-
nored significant impacts of GCDMA on nonlandowners by describing the BID’s powers as 
“essentially aesthetic”). 
263 In his definitive article on BIDs, Richard Briffault argues that BIDs lack real autonomy 
and hence should not be subject to the “one person, one vote” rule, but he acknowledges that the 
question is a close one. See Briffault, supra note 6, at 438-45. Briffault’s argument is subtle, but it is 
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By contrast, although neighborhood zoning districts may have signifi-
cant impacts on nonlandowners, such as prospective residents of affordable 
housing (a point I address in the next Section,) it is unlikely that neighbor-
hood zoning districts will have the kinds of impacts on nonlandowners that 
BIDs do because they tend to operate in homogeneous residential neighbor-
hoods rather than diverse downtown areas where the interests of tenants, 
vendors, street people, and other users are often implicated. In fact, all of 
the cases that I have discovered to date challenging the validity of neighbor-
hood zoning districts have been brought by landowners.264 As noted earlier, 
the fact that special assessment districts have frequently confronted legal 
challenges from both landowners and nonlandowners, whereas neighbor-
hood zoning districts have primarily been assailed only by landowners, 
strongly suggests that the former present greater cause for concern than the 
latter.265  
In conclusion, insofar as special assessment districts exercise coercive 
regulatory powers that have the potential to dramatically impact the rights 
of landowners and nonlandowners within their jurisdiction, they cannot be 
subject to any less constitutional scrutiny than neighborhood zoning districts.  
C. Spillovers and Comprehensive Planning 
There is one more way in which neighborhood zoning districts may be 
distinguished from special assessment districts. The doctrine and scholarship 
imply that one concern with neighborhood control of zoning is its potential 
to impose negative spillover impacts on neighboring areas and disrupt 
comprehensive land use planning on a citywide basis. While this is a valid 
concern, it is not a meaningful way of distinguishing special assessment 
districts from neighborhood zoning districts because the former are just as 
likely as the latter to cause harmful spillovers and impair comprehensive 
planning. Indeed, special assessment districts may be more likely to create 
these problems.  
The concern about spillovers is evident in existing scholarship about 
neighborhood zoning control. As discussed previously, Robert Ellickson and 
George Liebmann have proposed the creation of neighborhood or block-
 
unconvincing in at least one major respect. Like Ellickson, he stresses that BIDs do not “regulate.” 
Id. at 442. However, as just discussed, BIDs certainly exercise as much regulatory power as 
neighborhood zoning districts do.  
As discussed in Section III.B, supra, the water districts in Salyer and Ball and the special 
assessment districts in Bolen also had substantial impacts on nonlandowners.  
264 See cases cited supra note 240. 
265 See supra subsections III.B.1–2. 
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level improvement districts that would bring the advantages of BID gov-
ernance to residential or other neighborhoods outside the downtown areas 
where BIDs traditionally functioned.266 However, both Ellickson and 
Liebmann reject the idea of allocating anything more than token zoning 
authority to these neighborhood groups. Liebmann would permit neighbor-
hood associations to waive applicable zoning restrictions, but rejects neighbor-
hood power to impose zoning restrictions “because of the external effects 
that can result from them.”267 Ellickson likewise endorses the ability of 
block-front groups to waive otherwise applicable restrictions where “spillover 
effects are limited,” but not where doing so would impose “neighborhood-
wide negative externalities.”268  
Although neither Ellickson nor Liebmann expands on his reasons for 
objecting to neighborhood zoning control, the concern appears to be that if 
a neighborhood has unfettered ability to control its own land use, it can 
enact land use policies with little regard for the impact of its policies on 
neighboring areas or on the region as a whole. Many neighborhood groups, 
for example, will reflexively fall back upon NIMBY impulses and simply 
exclude unwanted land uses that may be in great demand on a citywide or 
regional basis. Suppose that a city has a desperate need for more affordable 
housing and that a developer proposes to site a low-income housing project 
in a particular neighborhood. If the neighborhood has the power to approve 
or disapprove new affordable housing projects, and if the landowners within 
the neighborhood determine that the affordable housing project will 
potentially diminish their own property values or quality of life, they will 
likely reject the project despite the citywide need for affordable housing. 
Doing so will then place pressure on neighboring areas to approve a site for 
the housing project, but if each neighborhood has the independent power to 
approve its own land uses, the housing project may find no suitable location 
anywhere in the city.269  
Neighborhood zoning control can also be problematic when neighbor-
hoods seek to include new uses instead of excluding them. If a neighborhood 
permits development at too rapid a pace, for example, it may place enormous 
 
266 See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text. 
267 Liebmann, supra note 12, at 362; see also Merrill, supra note 56, at 303 (favoring neighbor-
hood land use powers where the impacts are locally confined, but not where they have regional 
impacts). 
268 Ellickson, supra note 2, at 98-99. 
269 See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of finding ap-
propriate sites for LULUs because of neighborhood opposition). 
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strain on the city’s infrastructure or school system.270 In short, the structure 
of the neighborhood zoning district, which empowers landowners to make 
land use decisions based on how a particular new neighborhood entrant will 
affect their own property values, practically assures that each neighborhood 
will consider its own interests alone and ignore the citywide impacts of its 
zoning decisions. 
This concern with external impacts may implicitly underlie the Roberge 
doctrine as well. As I have noted previously, one of the many curiosities 
surrounding the Roberge line, and the Roberge decision in particular, is that it 
followed closely on the heels of the epochal Euclid decision of two years 
earlier, which broadly upheld the constitutionality of local zoning.271 
However, it is possible to distinguish Roberge from Euclid. The Euclid court 
placed substantial weight on the “comprehensive zoning plan” adopted by 
the village of Euclid, Ohio, for the rational development of the village as a 
whole.272 Although the respondent, Ambler Realty, objected that Euclid’s 
limitations on industrial development would divert such development to 
neighboring communities, the Court rebutted this argument by noting that 
the village had not banned industrial development entirely, but merely 
directed it to appropriate areas within the community where it would not 
disturb residential uses.273 The Court also issued an important caveat that if, 
in some future case, a municipality acted in such a way as to harm “the 
general public interest,” the Court might intervene.274 Roberge may have 
 
270 William Fischel has criticized Robert Nelson’s proposal to create permanent neighbor-
hood zoning districts on this very ground. Fischel argues that disaggregating the zoning power 
from other municipal functions will cause zoning decisions to be made without consideration of 
their impacts on these other functions. He provides an instructive example from New Hampshire: 
a municipal zoning ordinance effectively prevents any children of school age from residing in a 
section of town from which access to the local schools is extremely costly. If the district controlled 
its own zoning, Fischel argues, it would lift that zoning restriction without regard to whether 
doing so would inflict a burden on the community as a whole. See William A. Fischel, Voting, Risk 
Aversion, and the NIMBY Syndrome: A Comment on Robert Nelson’s “Privatizing the Neighborhood,” 7 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 881, 899-901 (1999); see also David L. Callies, et al., Ramapo Looking 
Forward: Gated Communities, Covenants, and Concerns, 35 URB. LAW. 177, 197 (2003) (“[Any] 
privatized ‘zoning’ effort itself results in uncoordinated land use planning of the area. . . . Air 
quality, property values, environmental preservation, efficient public services, and well-located 
schools all are better coordinated by a more regional government responsible for the region's 
public services.” (footnote omitted)). 
271 See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. 
272 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 379 (1926); see also id. at 379-83 (describing at 
length the village’s detailed development plan). 
273 See id. at 389-90 (“[Euclid’s] governing authorities . . . have determined, not that indus-
trial development shall cease at its boundaries, but that the course of such development shall 
proceed within definitely fixed lines.”). 
274 Id. at 390. 
  
2013] Neighborhood Empowerment 997 
 
been just such a case. In Roberge, there could be no assurance, as there was 
in Euclid, that the city of Seattle had comprehensively planned its land use 
needs and ensured an appropriate place for all uses because the city had 
delegated portions of its land use power to landowners without providing 
any standards to guide the exercise of that power. Absent standards, 
landowners were free to base their zoning decisions on “caprice” or other 
“selfish reasons.”275 In other words, landowners could make decisions 
without regard to the welfare of surrounding areas or the city as a whole.  
Neither the jurisprudence nor the commentary on neighborhood control 
of zoning addresses the possibility that special assessment districts or BIDs 
may similarly generate externalities or impair comprehensive planning. At 
first blush, indeed, it may appear as though one neighborhood’s decision to 
upgrade its sewer lines or provide itself with supplemental sanitation or 
security services cannot possibly impose any burden on neighboring areas, 
impair any municipal planning objectives, or strain city infrastructure—to 
the contrary, special assessment districts promise only to improve such 
infrastructure. However, as this Section shows, special assessment districts 
can create just as much havoc with municipal planning schemes and impose 
just as serious externalities on surrounding areas as neighborhood zoning 
districts are thought to do. Moreover, while it is possible that neighborhood 
zoning districts will increase the incidence of sloppy and haphazard land use 
planning, the reverse scenario is also plausible: neighborhood control of 
zoning may actually alleviate some of the haphazardness that exists in our 
current system of land use control. In short, neighborhood zoning districts 
may once again produce sounder public policy outcomes than special 
assessment districts. 
1. The Neighborhood Zoning District 
Taking neighborhood zoning first, I should start by puncturing the myth 
that the current system of land use planning in this country in any way 
conforms to the Euclidean ideal of comprehensive planning. For a variety of 
reasons, the number of incorporated general-purpose municipalities (i.e., 
municipalities empowered to utilize the zoning power) has exploded in the 
years since Euclid was decided.276 Most metropolitan regions today are 
comprised of several dozen municipalities, many of which are small suburban 
 
275 Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 122 (1928). 
276 See Briffault, supra note 3, at 356-82 (noting the increasing number of small suburban 
municipalities and discussing some of the causes of that phenomenon). 
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communities no larger than a neighborhood.277 The proliferation of small 
incorporated municipalities has generated virulent competition for tax 
revenue and a concomitant “fiscalization” of land use, in which each muni-
cipality regulates land use in order to maximize contributions to the muni-
cipal fisc rather than in accordance with some comprehensive land use plan 
for the harmonious development of the community.278 Despite Euclid, 
courts have largely accepted this practice, rarely requiring that municipali-
ties’ land use policies comply with anything resembling the comprehensive 
zoning plan in the Euclid case. For example, where Euclid was careful to 
emphasize that the village of Euclid was not entirely precluding industrial 
use,279 in the years since Euclid, courts have endorsed innovations such as 
“exclusionary” zoning in which unwanted land uses such as industry or 
affordable housing are simply excluded from an entire city, either de facto 
or de jure, without requiring that municipalities consider the impacts of 
such exclusionary policies on the surrounding region.280 Furthermore, 
courts have recognized and apparently accepted that cities use zoning for 
their own selfish, fiscal purposes—essentially, to bring in land uses and 
improvements that will enhance property values and the local tax base while 
excluding land uses that do the opposite.281 With few exceptions, courts 
 
277 See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 77 (1990) (noting that “in most metropolitan areas, there are dozens of 
independent municipalities” and that “[m]ore than three-quarters of all municipalities have fewer 
than 5,000 inhabitants”). 
278 See Schwartz, supra note 208, at 198-204 (discussing the “fiscalization” of land use and its 
implications for cities). Although municipal land use authority is formally subject to control by the 
state, in practice states almost never interfere in municipal land use decisions and, to the contrary, 
consistently act to enable municipal autonomy. See Briffault, supra note 277, at 59, 64 (arguing that 
state legislative involvement in local affairs reveals “a deep commitment to strong decision-making 
roles for local governments, protection of local communities from outside interference, reluctance 
to displace local choices and unwillingness to address the social and economic differences among 
localities”). 
279 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926). 
280 See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 254-58, 
270-71 (1977) (upholding the city’s exclusion of a low-income housing project against an equal 
protection challenge where the city was zoned primarily for single-family homes and only 27 
residents in a city of 64,000 were black because there was insufficient evidence of racially 
discriminatory motivation for the exclusion); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 2-3, 9 
(1974) (approving a zoning ordinance barring all uses other than owner-occupied single-family 
residences anywhere within the municipal borders); Duffcon Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Borough of 
Cresskill, 64 A.2d 347, 351 (N.J. 1949) (approving a zoning ordinance barring nonresidential uses 
and noting the availability of suitable land for industrial use elsewhere in the region). 
281 See, e.g., Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 258, 270 (accepting the city’s asserted rationale that 
its refusal to change its zoning requirements to permit affordable housing was based on existing 
residents’ “reliance” on existing zoning and the related concern that rezoning would cause a 
decline in property values). 
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have simply ignored Euclid’s caveat to protect the “general public interest.”282 
As a result, siting unwanted land uses such as affordable housing has 
become a major problem nationwide.283 
On the surface, delegating zoning power to neighborhood groups would 
exacerbate this trend. Given that the disturbing, beggar-thy-neighbor 
approach prevalent in current land use planning has largely been the result 
of the fragmentation of land use authority, it could hardly help matters to 
introduce even more fragmentation by dramatically increasing the number of 
regulatory entities privileged to engage in exclusionary policies. Or could it? 
Unlike the incorporated suburbs that ring our urban centers, neighbor-
hoods would receive their zoning powers from, and ultimately be account-
able to, the city government that empowered them. Where states have few 
incentives to supervise municipal zoning practices, zoning is a major source 
of power and revenue for cities. Thus, they will have tremendous incentives 
to closely monitor neighborhood zoning to ensure that neighborhoods do 
not unduly burden other areas of the city with externalities or impair 
citywide planning objectives. The relevant empirical studies, discussed 
previously, establish that where cities have delegated some zoning authority 
to neighborhood groups, they have not been shy about asserting themselves 
when other city priorities are at stake.284  
Cities can assert their supervisory control over neighborhood zoning 
districts in many ways. They may delegate only certain zoning powers to 
neighborhoods, such as the power to regulate particular land uses or the 
power to waive but not impose restrictions. Alternatively, they may dele-
gate only to certain neighborhoods, such as homogeneously residential or 
lightly developed areas.285 They could also give neighborhoods an initiatory 
 
282 The major exception is Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 
336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975), which struck down an exclusionary zoning ordinance and rejected fiscal 
concerns as a valid basis for exclusionary zoning practices, citing Euclid’s “general public interest” 
caveat. Id. at 726, 731. And that holding faced considerable resistance. See S. Burlington Cnty. 
NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 456 A.2d 390, 410 (N.J. 1983) (noting that nearly a decade 
later, Mt. Laurel’s zoning remained “blatantly exclusionary” and that Mt. Laurel was “not alone”). 
New Jersey Governor Chris Christie recently referred to the original Mount Laurel decision as “an 
abomination.” See ChrisChristieVideos, Chris Christie—Mt. Laurel Decision is an ABOMINATION, 
YOUTUBE (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MWRSpKkoQnc; Nancy Solomon, 
Uncertain Fate for Decision That Paved the Way for Affordable Housing in NJ, WNYC (May 7, 2012), 
http://www.wnyc.org/articles/new-jersey-news/2012/may/07/affordable.  
283 See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text. 
284 See BERRY ET AL., supra note 8, at 142-44, 298 (finding that individual neighborhood 
groups are generally unable to impede large projects important to a city’s economic future). 
285 The delegation schemes in Roberge, Cusack, and Eubank, of course did precisely this, dele-
gating narrowly tailored land use powers to specific neighborhoods. See supra Section II.A. 
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power subject to an override by the city council,286 or include sunset 
provisions that require reauthorization of the zoning power after a certain 
period of time. Finally, of course, municipalities can always repeal a delega-
tion of power at any time, as neighborhoods have no vested right to control 
their own zoning.287 In effect, a scheme of neighborhood zoning power 
under loose city control would resemble a form of regional or metropolitan 
government about which scholars have fantasized for decades.288  
Indeed, such a scheme could actually help reverse the current pattern of 
fragmented land use planning. The delegation of some limited land use 
powers to neighborhoods may discourage landowners from fleeing the city 
for incorporated suburbs where they can exercise the zoning power with 
total impunity. Historically, many home and business owners left the city 
for the suburbs because, among other things, in the suburbs they could 
much more easily control their immediate environment through zoning.289 
 
286 See, e.g., Tippett v. City of Hernando, 780 So.2d 649, 650-52 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) 
(describing a law requiring a supermajority of the municipality’s legislators to ratify any zoning 
change being protested by those near the proposed change); Eadie v. Town Bd., 854 N.E.2d 464, 
467 (N.Y. 2006) (upholding a statute requiring a supermajority vote of the town board to approve 
certain zoning changes after a written protest by a certain percentage of landowners in a designated 
proximity to the proposed change). 
287 See Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 96 N.E.2d 731, 733 (N.Y. 1951) (“[P]ersons who own 
property in a particular zone or use district enjoy no vested right to that classification if the public 
interest demands otherwise.”); see also, e.g., Grund v. Jefferson County, 277 So.2d 334, 338 (Ala. 
1973) (stating that property owners have no vested right in the zoning classification of their 
property); Spiker v. City of Lakewood, 603 P.2d 130, 133 (Colo. 1979) (en banc) (same); McGee v. 
City of Cocoa, 168 So. 2d 766, 769 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (same); Norbeck Vill. Joint Venture 
v. Montgomery Cnty. Council, 254 A.2d 700, 705 (Md. 1969) (same); Navin v. Town of Exeter, 
339 A.2d 12, 14 (N.H. 1975) (same); Gray v. Trustees, 313 N.E.2d 366, 369 (Ohio 1974) (same); 
Buhler v. Racine County, 146 N.W.2d 403, 408 (Wis. 1966) (same). 
288 See Briffault, supra note 2, at 526-28 (considering “sublocal structures” within cities to be 
“something akin to a metropolitan political structure,” and noting that the spillover effects of 
sublocal structures are more limited than those of localities because the former are subject to 
control by a locality whereas the latter are not). Scholars have long dreamed of unifying the 
patchwork of local government structures under some form of regional government that can 
minimize harmful externalities and interlocal inequalities, but regional government has largely 
failed to materialize because of opposition from vested interests in the existing system of local 
government, most prominently suburban dwellers who are loathe to lose autonomy over their 
schools, land use, and taxing powers. See, e.g., Cashin, supra note 2, at 2015-27 (discussing barriers 
to regionalism).  
289 See MICHAEL N. DANIELSON, THE POLITICS OF EXCLUSION 4, 35-39 (1976) (“Most 
suburban jurisdictions . . . have relatively homogeneous populations, which makes it easier to 
secure consensus on exclusionary policies than is commonly the case in larger and more hetero-
geneous cities.”). The ability of neighborhood organizations to combat flight to the suburbs was 
recognized as early as the 1930s. In 1935, Herbert Nelson, the Executive Secretary of the National 
Association of Real Estate Boards advocated for the creation of urban “Neighborhood Improve-
ment Districts,” stating that “the flight to the suburbs which we have witnessed during the past 
ten or fifteen years . . . was caused . . . by the desire of people to preserve the home environment.” 
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If cities were empowered to import some suburban-style zoning control, it 
might stem the impulse to flee the city. While urban landowners still would 
not have total control over their own zoning, they would at least have some 
control. And that fact, along with the substantial costs involved in selling 
their homes at depressed values, leaving behind relationships, forfeiting 
social capital to put down roots somewhere new, and giving up the amenities 
of urban living could help tilt the balance in deciding whether to move.290 
Thus, neighborhood zoning districts cannot be dismissed on the grounds 
that they—more so than incorporated municipalities—impede comprehen-
sive planning or impose overly burdensome externalities on neighboring 
communities.  
2. The Special Assessment District 
Conversely, special assessment districts can have severe impacts on urban 
planning objectives, and may create substantial spillover effects. An increase 
in development, business activity, or investment in one area of town will 
likely increase traffic, noise, and pressure on infrastructure in surrounding 
neighborhoods, while simultaneously siphoning off business and investment 
from those areas.291 Moreover, if the BID or special assessment district is 
successful in its mission to increase property values, higher rents will likely 
result, which may displace both residential and commercial tenants who 
then must find rental units elsewhere in the region.292 Likewise, BIDs’ 
efforts to make their jurisdictions attractive to tourists may “displace crime 
 
Marc A. Weiss & John T. Metzger, The American Real Estate Industry and the Origins of Neighbor-
hood Conservation, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AMERICAN 
PLANNING HISTORY 753, 758 (Laurence C. Gerckens ed., 1994) (citation omitted). 
290 Robert Nelson further argues that neighborhood control of zoning can actually solve the 
LULU problem by enabling neighborhood groups to receive compensation for permitting LULUs 
into their neighborhoods. See Nelson, supra note 30, at 846 (noting that it might be more efficient 
“to allow the [advocate of the LULU] to negotiate with the neighbors living nearby, rather than 
issuing an absolute prohibition on . . . zoning grounds”). As Nelson acknowledges, however, this 
solution would require courts to permit neighborhoods to expressly sell zoning rights, something 
courts have been reluctant to do. Id. at 835, 848-49. Nevertheless, this is another potential 
advantage of neighborhood zoning control. 
291 See Briffault, supra note 6, at 456 (“BID marketing and development programs may draw 
customers and investment away from other areas of the city.”). Sociologist Nathan Glazer has 
similarly argued that New York City’s zoning laws, which permitted and indeed encouraged 
massive density in the borough of Manhattan, caused the “withering of major subordinate business 
centers in the Bronx and Brooklyn” and the loss of urban amenities in areas outside the city’s 
dense core. NATHAN GLAZER, FROM A CAUSE TO A STYLE 238 (2007). 
292 See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text. 
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and social problems onto adjacent communities.”293 Finally, BIDs have been 
known to use their substantial lobbying power to push for zoning changes, 
such as the prohibition of adult businesses, which then must be absorbed by 
other neighborhoods.294 
BIDs and special assessment districts can also create a qualitatively 
different, but perhaps more significant, spillover effect by causing intralocal 
inequalities in the provision of services that can erode a city’s social fabric. 
Empowering territorially demarcated jurisdictions to finance their own 
infrastructure and services has an inherent tendency to balkanize the urban 
environment into enclaves that reinforce, among other things, class, income, 
and racial divisions. BIDs and special assessment districts are part of a “get 
what you pay for” model of municipal financing, in which the quantity and 
quality of services each neighborhood receives are based entirely on its 
ability to pay.295 The result is that wealthy neighborhoods that can afford 
the added burden of assessments will voluntarily assume that burden in 
order to finance and obtain highly desirable services, while poor neighbor-
hoods may decline to approve an assessment—even for services they 
desperately need—if they decide the assessment is too costly.296 While 
services financed by assessments are theoretically supposed to be supplemen-
tal, cities have strong incentives to reduce their expenditures by “outsourcing” 
the provision of municipal services to special assessment districts.297 As a 
result, where special assessments are a major source of municipal financing—
such as in the Sunbelt states, where constitutional limits or extreme political 
hostility often block tax increases—large inequalities persist between rich, 
white neighborhoods and poor, minority neighborhoods.298 Such in-
equalities can, of course, breed resentment as poor neighborhoods endure 
 
293 Briffault, supra note 6, at 456. But see Philip J. Cook & John MacDonald, Public Safety 
Through Private Action: An Economic Assessment of BIDs, 121 ECON J. 445, 458 (2011) (finding that 
“BIDs have no meaningful effect on crime in nearby areas”). 
294 See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
295 See Reynolds, supra note 5, at 432-33. 
296 See Briffault, supra note 2, at 528-29; Reynolds, supra note 5, at 433-34 (acknowledging 
“the troubling implications” of a system that “explicitly limit[s] access to municipal services on the 
basis of ability to pay”). 
297 See supra note 216; see also Reynolds, supra note 5, at 433 (“If those who can pay for a 
better level of services are content, the pressure to enhance service across the municipality is 
generally reduced.”). 
298 A troubling example of this trend was implicated in Hadnott v. City of Prattville, 309 F. 
Supp. 967 (M.D. Ala. 1970). As a result of a local government practice by which street pavings 
were provided only upon a petition of landowners willing to pay a special assessment to finance it, 
ninety-seven percent of white residents lived on paved streets, whereas only sixty-five percent of 
black residents did. Id. at 970. Because there was no evidence of racially discriminatory intent, the 
court found that the scheme did not offend the Federal Equal Protection Clause. Id. 
  
2013] Neighborhood Empowerment 1003 
 
substandard services while nearby wealthy neighborhoods lavish themselves 
with improvements. Two prominent scholars have even speculated that one 
underlying cause of Los Angeles’s Rodney King riots in the summer of 1992 
was the city’s use of a geographically targeted financing mechanism to 
shower downtown Los Angeles with millions of dollars in redevelopment 
money while neglecting adjacent minority neighborhoods.299 
In sum, special assessment districts may be just as troublesome for advo-
cates of comprehensive planning, and just as likely to cause undesirable 
spillovers as neighborhood zoning districts. 
CONCLUSION: THE NEIGHBORHOOD AND THE SUBURB 
The purpose of this paper has not been to join the chorus of BID critics,300 
but rather to highlight some heretofore unappreciated virtues of the neigh-
borhood zoning district, and to demonstrate that courts and commentators 
have seriously erred in their inconsistent treatment of these two devices. 
Within appropriate limits, both the neighborhood zoning district and the 
BID/special assessment district can be powerful tools for helping cities 
survive and prosper during a time of great interlocal competition, in which 
small suburban communities have the advantage of nearly unchecked land 
use authority. There is a role for the courts in delineating when a delegation 
of power to the neighborhood level is appropriate, but the courts must 
eschew facile distinctions between the neighborhood zoning district and the 
special assessment district, and instead focus on a series of ad hoc factors 
suggested by the foregoing analysis. First, does the entity exercise coercive 
regulatory power, either directly or indirectly, and how far does the power 
encroach upon the ability of both landowners and nonlandowners to use and 
access land? Second, does the entity exercise a function or functions about 
which serious intra-group disagreement is likely? Third, is the area gov-
erned by the entity sufficiently heterogeneous in terms of land uses, de-
mographics, or other interests so as to engender disagreements among 
members, and yet insufficiently heterogeneous as to permit vigorous vote-
trading? Fourth, is the entity a one-shot deal or does it exercise power on an 
ongoing basis? Fifth, is the entity likely to generate negative externalities, 
 
299 See DENNIS R. JUDD & TODD SWANSTROM, CITY POLITICS: PRIVATE POWER 
AND PUBLIC POLICY 388-89 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing the use of “tax-increment financing”). 
300 For critical assessments of the BID, see, for example, Frug, supra note 14; Garodnick, 
supra note 170; and Audrey G. McFarlane, Preserving Community in the City: Special Improvement 
Districts and the Privatization of Urban Racialized Space, 4 STAN. AGORA 1, 7-18 (2003) (explaining 
that BIDs result in unevenness in the quality of life among neighborhoods and raise issues 
regarding who should govern the BID and to what extent the franchise may be limited). 
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impair comprehensive planning, or promote intralocal inequality and 
balkanization? Finally, and perhaps most importantly, is the entity mean-
ingfully constrained by a large, diverse governmental body that can counter-
act the threat of exploitation or other welfare-reducing actions by the 
entity? The main objective of this inquiry, of course, is to ensure that there 
are sufficient safeguards against abuses of power by neighborhood districts.  
This last observation, however, leads to another quandary, with which 
this Article concludes. I noted previously that while courts are highly 
skeptical of neighborhood zoning control, they afford substantial deference 
to the exercise of the zoning power by incorporated municipalities.301 Most 
incorporated municipalities today, however, are small suburbs no larger 
than neighborhoods.302 What can explain why courts so eagerly defer to 
neighborhood-sized municipalities but not to actual neighborhoods? Is there 
some reason to think that municipalities perform better than neighborhoods 
on the list of ad hoc factors set forth in the previous paragraph, such that 
greater deference is warranted? Quite the contrary. In fact, virtually all of 
the potential checks on abuse of power listed above are absent or signifi-
cantly reduced when the land use authority is exercised by incorporated 
municipalities. 
Consider an ironic epilogue to the Roberge trio. In the 1976 case City of 
Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, a developer proposed to site an apartment 
building in Eastlake, Ohio, a suburb of Cleveland with a population of 
approximately 20,000.303 Shortly thereafter, the voters of Eastlake amended 
their city charter to provide that all zoning changes must be approved by a 
referendum of city voters.304 Although Eubank and Roberge drew into 
question the validity of delegating the zoning power to a voter referendum, 
the Supreme Court upheld the charter amendment, distinguishing Eubank 
and Roberge on the grounds that the challenged ordinances in those cases 
delegated power to a “narrow segment of the community, not to the people 
at large.”305 The referendum at issue in Eastlake was “far more than an 
expression of ambiguously founded neighborhood preference. It is the city 
itself legislating through its voters—an exercise by the voters of their 
traditional right . . . [to decide] what serves the public interest.”306 For 
 
301 See supra note 277. 
302 See supra note 3. 
303 426 U.S. 668, 670 (1976); id. at 694 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
304 Id. at 670 (majority opinion). 
305 Id. at 677-78. 
306 Id. at 678 (quoting S. Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d 
291, 294 (9th Cir. 1970)).  
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the Court, then, there was a fundamental difference between a mere 
neighborhood and “the city itself.” 
By almost any of the metrics we have considered so far, however, the 
referendum at issue in Eastlake should be far more troubling than the 
schemes in either Roberge or Eubank. The referendum provisions in Roberge 
and Eubank conferred very limited powers on neighborhood groups to cast a 
one-shot vote on particular land use questions, limiting the possibility of 
intra-group disagreement and exploitation.307 By contrast, the Eastlake 
charter amendment subjected all zoning changes in the city to a referendum 
by city voters, thus increasing opportunities for exploitation. Moreover, in 
Roberge and Eubank, there was, at least in principle, some opportunity for 
opponents of the delegation in question to prevent the delegation by 
logrolling in the city council prior to the ordinance. In Eastlake, by contrast, 
there was never any opportunity for the aggrieved developer to attempt 
logrolling because the zoning-referendum mechanism was itself adopted by 
a one-shot voter initiative during which, of course, vote-trading would have 
been impossible.  
Moreover, while the record did not reflect how diverse the city of 
Eastlake was, it is far more likely that a few dozen homeowners in a 
homogeneously zoned neighborhood would share common views about a 
proposal to site a group home in their neighborhood (Roberge) than that a 
city of 20,000 would share common views about the entire range of zoning 
matters that regularly come before a typical city (Eastlake). Finally, because 
Eastlake’s referendum scheme was clearly intended to exclude an affordable 
housing project from the city, it raises all the concerns about negative 
spillovers, impairment of regional planning objectives, siting of locally 
unwanted land uses, and interlocal inequality that we have canvassed 
previously. In Roberge, by contrast, Seattle’s law would have enabled 
neighborhood groups only to permit group homes that were otherwise 
barred by a municipal zoning ordinance, not to exclude them.308 Ironically, 
then, the schemes at issue in Eubank and Roberge provided far greater 
procedural protections against the abuse of power than the scheme in 
Eastlake. Why, then, is the Court so much more skeptical of a neighborhood 
referendum than a referendum conducted by “the city itself”?309  
 
307 See supra notes 68-71 & 76-78 and accompanying text. 
308 See Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 117-18 (1928) 
(describing a zoning scheme under which a philanthropic home for children or the elderly would 
not typically be permitted in a residential district, but prohibition could be overridden with the 
consent of the owners of two thirds of the property within 400 feet of the proposed home). 
309 See supra text accompanying note 306. 
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Frank Michelman’s perceptive reading of Eastlake provides a possible 
answer. According to Michelman, Eastlake’s apparently casual distinction 
between a “neighborhood preference” and the “public interest” implicated 
in a citywide referendum suggests that Eastlake rejects the entire public 
choice model we have considered so far, with its depictions of sordid 
logrolling and self-seeking interest groups.310 Rather, Eastlake appears to 
favor a “public interest” model, in which a civic-minded public deliberates 
in platonic fashion on important city affairs.311 Michelman argues that the 
Eastlake Court’s distinction of Eubank and Roberge expresses, albeit some-
what crudely, the belief that the political realm is not a mere extension of 
the private market, in which self-interested groups haggle for their slice of 
the pie.312 Rather, there is 
a strong and clear differentiation of the special role one plays as citizen from 
one’s normal, everyday pursuits as private individual and, relatedly, . . . a 
careful construction of special formal or ceremonial contexts designed to 
place the individual in the special citizen’s role—to force that role on the 
individual by cultural means—on those special occasions when political as 
distinguished from normally self-regarding private action is in progress.313  
According to Michelman, Eastlake should be read to mean that a neighbor-
hood zoning referendum, in which an “immediately interested person” 
participates in a “one-time blockfront decision,” does not create the neces-
sary background conditions to awaken in the individual the “special citizen’s 
motivational mode of sympathy and responsibility for all equally.”314 When, 
by contrast, the referendum is placed before the entire city, “which main-
tains a continuing salience in [the voter’s] consciousness of political life,”315 
the appropriate signal is sent to each voter that the time has come for 
public-minded political action rather than “normally self-regarding private 
action.”316 From this perspective, interestingly, an entity that exercises 
zoning power on an ongoing basis is more legitimate than the “one-shot 
 
310 See Michelman, supra note 61, at 182-83 (explaining that Eastlake arguably adopted a public 
interest model based on the view that “there is nothing crucially objectionable about letting 
decisions be made by a process such as a referendum vote offering no opportunity for vote-
trading, because the object of the process is supposed to be communal definition of aims”). 
311 Id. 
312 See id. (suggesting that the Court in Eastlake adopted Rousseau’s view that when individ-
uals act politically, they act “on behalf of and with regard to one another, as well as themselves, as 
persons worthy of a full and equal measure of respect”). 
313 Id. at 184. 
314 Id. 
315 Id. at 185. 
316 Id. at 184. 
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deal” referenda involved in Eubank and Roberge—precisely the opposite of 
what the public-choice analysis to this point has suggested.  
Michelman’s exegesis works well as an attempt to divine the meaning 
behind Eastlake’s cryptic opinion. It does not work at all—nor is it intended—
as a normative defense of local government autonomy. Eastlake’s blatantly 
exclusionary referendum scheme cannot realistically be described as public-
minded political action. It is instead a fairly typical instance of a suburban 
municipality acting selfishly to protect its own wealth by excluding a land 
use project that threatens to increase the local tax burden and lower property 
values. As we have seen, this sort of self-regarding action by autonomous 
incorporated municipalities has bedeviled efforts to site locally undesirable 
but regionally necessary land uses, such as affordable housing. Nor can we 
give much credence to the argument that Eastlake, unlike the one-shot 
constructs in Eubank and Roberge, is an entity that “maintains a continuing 
salience in [the voter’s] consciousness of political life.”317 Many suburbs are 
themselves nothing more than constructs created in order to accomplish 
particular, self-regarding goals. It is commonplace for areas to incorporate 
for purely economic reasons, such as controlling their own tax base or land 
use.318 Indeed, there are numerous instances of suburban areas incorporating 
“defensively” for the sole purpose of defeating a proposed land use siting or 
annexation, or to seize control of a revenue-generating entity.319 States have 
long abandoned the notion that a group must constitute a “community” in 
any meaningful sense in order to incorporate as a municipality.320  
Thus, the juridical distinction between municipal–land use control and 
neighborhood–land use control turns out to be just as baseless as the 
distinction between special assessment districts and neighborhood zoning 
districts. There is no reason, in law or public policy, to fetishize the incor-
porated suburb as a forum for enlightened land use decisionmaking while 
deriding the neighborhood as parochial and self-regarding. To the extent 
neighborhood control of zoning raises basic concerns about democratic 
accountability, majoritarian exploitation, spillover impacts, intralocal 
 
317 Id. at 185. 
318 See Briffault, supra note 212, at 1141-42 (“Local boundary lines have often been drawn in 
order to take advantage of the opportunity local government law provides incorporated 
communities to control local land use and to escape from the fiscal burdens of the surrounding 
metropolitan region.”). 
319 See Schragger, supra note 212, at 1849 (providing numerous examples of “defensive” 
incorporations, such as incorporating to “avoid being annexed to a less-affluent area” or to prevent 
the construction of an additional airport runway). 
320 See Briffault, supra note 277, at 75-76 (explaining that courts liberally sustain municipal 
incorporations without regard to whether the area to be incorporated represents a “community of 
interest”). 
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inequality, and the like, courts can address those concerns by looking to the 
ad hoc factors articulated herein, rather than through a blanket condem-
nation of neighborhood zoning. A close examination of those factors should 
reveal, more often than not, that neighborhood control of zoning under city 
supervision offers many advantages over our current system of highly 
fragmented land use authority, in which incorporated municipalities have 
the freedom to enact policies that serve local interests at the expense of 
regional needs. 
